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The scope of the dissertation is microeconometrics. The first essay is on human
capital formation, the second essay is on personality, and the third essay is on labor
market decisions.
Using a randomized experiment, the first essay examines the impact of mother’s
human capital on the cognitive and non cognitive skills of her preschool children.
The second essay1 examines the impact of the big five personality traits on the
decision to be self employed and on the income of salaried vs. self employed people.
We try to distinguish the impact of personality traits on labor market performance
from the relationship between personality and preferences for entrepreneurship.
Finally, in the third essay2 we are trying to estimate the labor market wage
premium for shift workers. We use an equilibrium sorting framework to model
location decisions around the clock. Using the estimated model we try to disentangle
the amenity value of daylight from social interaction effects.
1This essay is a joint work with Barton Hamilton.
2This essay is a joint work with Juan Pantano.
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Chapter 1
Assessing the Impact of Mothers’ Investment in
Human Capital on Childrens’ Outcomes
1.1 Introduction
The view that cognitive,social and behavioral skills are important determinants
of an individual’s academic and socioeconomic success in life is gaining ground in
the literature studying academic and economic inequality (Cawley Heckman and
Vytlacil 2001; Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Murnane Willett and Levy 1995; Neal
and Johnson 1996; Bowles Gintis and Osborne 2001; Heckman and Rubinstein 2001;
Heckman Stixrud and Urzua 2006). Cognitive skills refer to mental or intellectual
abilities of an individual while social and behavioral skills refer to what is known as
emotional intelligence. A widely held view in this literature is that these abilities are
largely influenced by pre-school /early childhood experiences of the child. A large
multidisciplinary literature has been trying to determine the impact of parental
characteristics, early home environment and school quality in producing these skills
but there is still a lack of consensus on the relative importance of these factors on
skills. Determining the relative importance of these factors coupled with the right
age at which they can be influenced becomes particularly important for examining
1
the efficacy of various policies targeting child development. Our paper is a step in
this direction.
Using a randomized experiment that provided education, training and life skill
services to teenage high school dropout mothers’, we try to ascertain the impact of
an increase in the mothers’ human capital on the cognitive and behavioral skills of
their preschool children. There have been very few attempts to examine the impact
of an increase in the mothers’ human capital on the abilities of children. To the best
of our knowledge this is one of the the first papers that is trying to examine the im-
pact of an increase in mothers’ human capital on preschool children’s cognitive and
emotional skills.1 We also examine the importance of other factors considered in
literature like the home environment and maternal employment. Maternal employ-
ment can increase the child’s abilities because it may increase the human capital the
mother passes on to the child. It might also work through the income effect route.
It may also reduce the development because employment might conflict with the
time the mother can give to the child. These questions have been examined earlier
not only in economics but in child development, psychology and health literature
also (Desai et al 1989; Brooks-Gunn et al 2002; Auld and Sidhu 2005; Murnane et
al 1981; Carlson and Corcoran 2001).
Most of the previous studies in economics have tried to estimate child skill devel-
opment through education/skill production functions. Endogeneity of explanatory
variables due to missing data on children’s home and school inputs as well as miss-
ing genetic endowments coupled with measurement errors has plagued estimation
of these production function parameters. Additionally, different specifications of
1We recently became aware of work by Magnuson (2007) on similar lines on a different dataset
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the function results in varied conclusions about the outcomes (Krueger 2003). The
main problem in estimating the effect of mothers’ human capital on the child’s skills
is that mothers’ unobserved abilities will influence both her and the child’s skill ac-
quisition thereby giving an upward bias to the estimated impact of mothers’ skills.
Our paper gets around this issue by virtue of the randomization in the data. The
increase in the home inputs, education and skills of the mothers’ in the experimental
group is due to their participation in the new chance program and hence being in
the treatment group serves as an instrument for the endogenous variables.
Nearly all existing work examining child cognitive development include moth-
ers’ education as an input while estimating the cognitive/ non cognitive achievement
production function. In an early estimation of the production function for human
capital of children Leibowitz (1974) concludes that even in a sample of high IQ chil-
dren mothers’ education was significantly related to child’s IQ.Cunha and Heckman
(2008) estimate models of evolution of cognitive and non cognitive skills over the
life cycle of children. They find that parental inputs affect the formation of both
non cognitive skills and cognitive skills. Direct measures of mothers’ ability affect
cognitive skills but not non cognitive skills. They also find that cognitive skills are
shaped at earlier ages while non cognitive skills are more malleable at later ages.
They claim that ages 6-7 are the sensitive periods for cognitive skill formation while
8-9 years are the sensitive periods for non cognitive skills. Our paper examines the
sensitivity of these skills at earlier ages thereby eliminating the need to separate
out effects of school enrollment and increase in maternal human capital.
An important difference between experimental and non experimental studies is
pointed out by Todd and Wolpin (2003). Production function estimation falls under
3
the non experimental category because here inputs in the production function are
subject to choices made by parents and school. Experimental studies on the other
hand involve at least some or all the inputs being chosen by random assignment.
They point out that the parameters estimated in experimental/natural experiment
studies typically differ from those estimated in non experimental studies and one
type of evidence does not substitute for the other. They warn against drawing
comparisons between the two types of estimates under the presumption that they
are estimating the same parameter. Our work is closely related to Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1994). They examine the effect of maternal education on the intellectual
achievement of the child. They set out a model incorporating human capital produc-
tion in children, fertility and maternal schooling investment as well as heterogeneity
in human capital endowments. Their results indicate that maternal schooling at-
tainment has positive influence on the achievement measures of children but not
on their ability measures, net of other inputs and endowment heterogeneity among
mothers’. They also find that mothers’ who remain in school after having a child do
not augment the intellectual growth of that child but do augment the intellectual
growth of subsequent children. Our work is different from theirs in two aspects: (i)
they examined the returns to maternal schooling for school going children while we
do it for preschool children and (ii) they used a non experimental dataset (NLSY)
while we do the estimation for an experimental dataset. Our results are similar to
what they find. An increase in mothers’ human capital does not seem to significantly
affect the cognitive ability of the child born before the increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the data. Section
3 talks about the methodology and results. Section 4 concludes.
4
1.2 Data
The data for our study comes from the New Chance project. New Chance was a
voluntary demonstration project that provided comprehensive education, training
and other services intended to increase the long-term self-sufficiency and well being
of a group of high school dropout teenage mothers’ who were receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). During the program’s demonstration
phase, which began in 1989 and concluded in 1992, New Chance was operated
by community-based organizations, schools, a community college, and municipal
agencies at 16 locations (or ”sites”) in 10 states across the country.2
It was targeted at 16 to 22 year old mothers’ who had first given birth at 19
or younger, were not pregnant when they entered the program, had dropped out
of high school and were receiving cash welfare assistance. Most women enrolled in
the program voluntarily, though some were referred by welfare-to-work programs.
Women who applied and were determined to be eligible for New Chance were ran-
domly assigned to one of two groups: the experimental group or the control group.
The experimental group could enroll in the program while the control group could
not join New Chance but could receive other services available in their communities.
New Chance was implemeted in two phases:
• Phase 1 centered on education, career exposure, and a number of services
2The New Chance program was run at the following 16 sites: Allentown (Pennsylvania), Bronx
(New York), Chicago Heights (Illinois), Chula Vista (California), Denver (Colorado), Detroit
(Michigan), Harlem (New York), Inglewood (California), Jacksonville (Florida), Lexington (Ken-
tucky), Minneapolis (Minnesota), Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania), Port-
land (Oregon), Salem (Oregon), San Jose (California). The distribution across the sites is pre-
sented in Table 1.8
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falling under the general rubric of ”personal development” (for example, par-
enting, family planning, and life skills). During this phase, services were
delivered mostly at the program site. Typically, the program ran from 9 a.m.
until 3 p.m. five days a week, with daily attendance at all classes expected.
Local programs were intended to be small in size, enrolling 100 participants
over 12 to 18 months and serving about 40 participants at any given time, in
order to promote an intimate and personal environment in which participants
and staff could establish close bonds.
• Phase 2 services encompassed occupational skills training and work experience
(both of which were generally off-site) and ultimately job placement assistance.
Although college was not a formal part of the New Chance model, staff mem-
bers at some sites encouraged participants to enroll in college, especially in
two-year programs with a vocational focus.
Enrollees were permitted to remain in the program for 18 months, throughout which
time case managers were expected to counsel them and monitor their progress. Each
site had case managers who kept track of each participants progress and provided
continuous guidance and support. There were follow-ups at 18 and 42 months.
The outcome variables considered for measuring cognitive and non cognitive
skills are Bracken Basic Concept Scale School Readiness Component (BBCS) and
Behavior Problems Index (BPI) respectively. The BBCS is a measure of receptive
language that assesses the mastery of basic concepts; the School Readiness Com-
ponent consists of five subtests of the BBCS: colors, letter identification, numbers,
comparisons, and shapes. The scores shown are standard scores on a scale that
ranges from 1 to 19; a standard score of 6.9 corresponds to about the 15th per-
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centile nationally. The BPI is a widely employed scale for describing the incidence
of behavioral problems of children aged four or older, usually as described by a
parent. Raw scores for the BPI and its six subtests were converted to standardized
normed scores, which are based on data from the 1981 National Health Interview
Survey. These standard scores (with a mean of 100) are standardized separately
for boys and girls within single years of age. A higher score points to more be-
havioral problems. The potentially endogenous variables that we instrument for by
using participation in the experiment include HOME scale and mothers’ educational
status and mothers’ earning at month 42. The HOME (Home Observation Mea-
surement of the Environment) scale is a survey measure of parenting and the home
environment. It appraises the orderliness, cleanliness, and safety of the physical
environment, the regularity and structure of the family’s daily routine, the amount
of intellectual stimulation available to the child and the degree of emotional sup-
port provided by parents. It does this through a combination of questions asked
of the parent and items to be completed by the interviewer after spending time
in the home observing the child’s physical surroundings and the parent and child
interacting with one another.
Our sample consists of 2079 women. Out of 88 were missing the BBCS, 35 were
missing the BPI score and 237 were missing both. Also a few were missing some
of the explanatory variables. Hence our final estimation includes 1754 observations
for BBCS and 1807 observations for BPI. The BBCS and BPI scores for the sample
are summarized in Table 1.1. 61 were missing home score but we did not drop these
observations, we included a missing home score dummy in the estimation. Basic
summary statistics of the sample used are presented in Table 1.1. The women
7
were on an average 19 years old when they joined the program. They had given
birth when they were around 17 years of age. More than 50% of the enrolees were
black and 60% of the program participants had completed grade 10 or less. We
also did some mean comparison tests to check the randomness of the sample at
baseline. Results are presented in Table 1.2. Since mothers’ were assigned to one
or the other group at random, the two groups did not differ at the onset of the
study. Therefore, any differences between them that emerged during the follow-up
period can be attributed to the program. The distribution of sample across sites is
provided in appendix B.
1.3 Methodology and Results
We use the following specification of cognitive achievement/behavior, where we in-
clude both current and past inputs:
Y sij = αo + α1T
s
ij + α2F
s
ij + δj + ij (1.3.1)
where s = c, nc is the cognitive and behavioral test score for the child, Y sij is outcome
s for child i at location j, T sij is the vector of potentially endogenous inputs. Includes
mothers’ education, earnings and HOME score, F sij is the demographic chracteristics
and household inputs at baseline. Includes mothers’ age, education of grandparents,
mothers’ depression score. δj are the site fixed effects.
We begin by estimating the outcome equations by simple OLS. The results are
presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.3. Site dummies are included in both
regressions to account for the differences across sites in the composition of women
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who enrolled for the program. We also use mothers’ earning as a channel through
which an increase in mothers’ human capital can increase children’s outcomes in
our regression. Mothers’ earning could impact child skill formation through two
channels: (a) Mothers’ employment results in income which in turn determines
certain inputs that go into the child skill production function. Additionally the
human capital/social skills acquired by the mother at work could also be beneficial to
the child and hence there could be a positive impact of mothers’ employment on the
child skill formation (b) Employment could result in less time being spent with/on
the child by the mother. It could also lead to depression leading to lesser inclination
to provide quality parenting to the child. Other covariates include mother more
than grade 10 at baseline, mothers’ test of adult basic education(TABE) score at
baseline, age of mother at baseline, indicator for black or hispanic, mothers’ dad
stayed with her at age 14, mothers’ family never on welfare when young, mother ever
married at baseline, childs’ age is greater than 18 months at baseline, indicator for
boy, at least one grandparent has completed high school or more, mothers’ CESD
depression score at baseline along with site dummies.
The sign on the coefficients from least squares estimation of the treatment vari-
ables are what we expect for both regressions. Mothers’ education and home score
has a positive impact on both cognitive and behavior measures, as does the earning
in last 12 months by mother variable. For the cognitive skill score all of the treat-
ment variables except mothers’ earning in the last 12 months are significant at 1%.
BPI on the other hand seems to be affected only by the home score.3 The children
of mothers’ who have completed high school/GED by month 42 on an average have
a BBCS score .47 higher than the score of ones whose mothers’ do not have a high
3For BPI a higher score signifies a worse outcome
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school/GED. If mother has some college credit by month 42 then the score gap
increases by .69 (10% of the average). For a one unit increase in HOME score we
see the BBCS score go up by .05 and the BPI score go down by .24. Even though
the results conform to our beliefs about the relationship between these inputs and
child skills, we approach them with caution because of the potential bias in the co-
efficients of the treatment variables due to omitted mothers’ ability which we expect
to be correlated with both the treatment and the dependent variable.
To address this problem we do IV estimation of our equations. Due to the
randomized nature of the experiment we will expect mothers’ in the treatment group
to have higher levels of human capital due to their participation in the program and
not due to their ability. Hence it can serve as an instrument for the endogenous
variables. Interactions between site dummies and program participation also cause
additional variation in the mothers’ human capital due to the possible differences in
the way the program was run across different sites by the case managers and program
staff.4 Hence, we instrument for the treatment variables with participation in the
program and program participation interacted with the site dummies.5 Table 1.3
columns 2 and 4 present the IV estimates for the cognitive and emotional skill
equations. These coefficients tell us the impact of the increment in mothers’ human
capital on the child’s skill formation instead of the total impact of mothers’ abilities
on the child’s abilities. We control to some extent for the mothers’ existing stock
of skill by including the mothers’ TABE score at baseline.
After instrumenting for the endogenous variables the impact of nearly all the
4Using multisite programs to create instruments is fairly common in literature. See Bloom
(2005)
5Details provided in appendix B
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treatment variables becomes insignificant. None of the treatment variables has a
significant impact on the BBCS score. Additionally the signs associated with some
of the coefficients also change even though they are now insignificant. Note that the
mothers’ has high school/GED dummies now have ’wrong’ signs in both BBCS and
BPI regression. The coefficent on mothers’ earnings also changes signs for the BBCS
score but is still insignificant. For both the BBCS and BPI score the significance
of the HOME score goes away. Table 1.3 columns 2 and 4 seem to suggest that
after controlling for family background, post birth investment in mothers’ human
capital is not significantly affecting the pre school outcomes of their child on average.
However these results are averages over all children and could be hiding differences
across groups. In order to examine this we estimate seperate regressions for race
and age of child at baseline. This is done to check for differences in outcome for
one particular race that might be driving the result. Since the data does not have
the actual age of the child, some of the children might already be in school when
the tests were administered. This might distort the results, hence we separately
estimate the equations for children < 18 months at baseline (hence they will still
be preschool at the time of taking the tests) and children > 18 months at baseline
(might already be in school at the time of test). Results for race are presented
in Table 1.4 panels A, B and C. There are some differences across racial groups
in terms of the importance and significance of the treatment variables. The home
score is consistently significant and positively related to the BPI score in the least
squares regression across all racial groups except for the BBCS score in hispanics.
All variables have the ’right’ or expected sign in the OLS regression for blacks and
hispanics. The mothers’ earning coefficient has a ’wrong’ sign for whites. The
instrumental variables estimates vary in sign, magnitude and significance across
11
the three groups. Home score remains significant at 5% and its impact increases
the BBCS score in blacks. For whites and hispanics none of the variables are
significantly determining the child outcomes once we account for endogeneity with
mothers’ ability. Table 1.5 panels A and B present the OLS and IV results for
children > 18 months and children < 18 months at baseline respectively. The least
squares outcomes for children < 18 months are very similar to the overall results in
terms of signs and significance of the coefficients. For children > 18 months, home
score is the only significant variable for both BBCS and BPI. After instrumenting
mothers’ education variables loose their significance and become of the ’wrong’ sign
for either BPI or BBCS across both categories in Table 1.5 panel B columns 2 and
4.
Hence instrumenting the potentially endogenous variables is giving insignificant
and counterintutive results. This however does not imply that mothers’ human
capital does not impact the childs’ outcomes. The significant increase in standard
errors in panel B for all regressions raise suspicion about weak instruments, hence we
checked the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regressions. The
F statistics associated with the first stage of the instrumental variable regressions
are presented in Table 1.9. They confirm our suspicion of weak instruments. We
then try to see the effectiveness of the program for mothers’ and the impact on the
children of the program through other measures.
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1.3.1 Intent to Treat and Treatment on the Treated
We now look at the whether the program had any effect on the childs’ outcome
through a simple intent to treat (ITT) regression of the child outcome on the pro-
gram assignment indicator.
Yij = pio + pi1Zij + pi2Xij + δj + ij (1.3.2)
where Yij is outcome of interest for person i at location j, Zij is the program assign-
ment indicator, where
Zij =

1 if mother in the treatment group
0 if mother in the control group
Xij is the vector of exogenous inputs. Includes mothers’ age, education of grand-
parents, mothers’ depression score. δj are the site fixed effects.
We also do the above for the six subcomponents of the BPI score (anxious or
depressed, antisocial, dependent, headstrong, hyperactive and peerconflict) to see
if any one dimension was particularly affected. The analysis is also done for the
Positive Behavior Index (PBI) and its subcomponents (autonomy, compliance/self
control and social competence/sensitivity). Since by the second interview some chil-
dren have started going to school, we also include a school performance variable in
our ITT. In this variable the mother ranks the performance of the child in school on
a scale of 0 to 10 with higher magnitude implying better performance. Additionally
we also look at the effect of the program on the endogenous variables considered in
13
the IV regressions above. The results are presented in column 1 of Table 1.6.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.6 present estimates of the treatment on the treated
(TOT) effects. For the TOT we generate the program participation indicator Dij,
where
Dij =

1 if participation hours in New Chance > 0
0 if participation hours in New Chance = 0
Column 2 estimates the impact of the program by a simple regression of the outcome
on the program participation indicator. TOT instruments the program participation
indicator with the program assignment. Hence TOT estimates the equation:
Yij = γo + γ1Dij + γ2Xij + δj + ij (1.3.3)
where
Dij = βo + β1Zij + β2Xij + δj + ηij (1.3.4)
From all the three analysis it seems that the New Chance program is affecting
the children outcome negatively. The coefficients of the program assignment and
participation dummy indicate that it decreases the BBCS score and increases the
BPI score for children. The coefficients for BPI are significant also. ITT coefficient
indicates that the children of the treatment mothers’ have a 3% lower BBCS score
than the control group mothers’. The TOT also has similar coefficient even though
both are insignificant. On examining the subcomponents of BPI, we find that all
subcomponents are negatively affected by mothers’ participation in the program
(depression, anxiousness and peerconflict are also significantly affected). More im-
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portantly, the subcomponents measuring anxiousness/depression and peerconflict
show a significant increase. ITT and TOT show that the children of the treatment
group mothers’ have on an average 1.5-2% higher anxiousness and peerconflict than
the control group mothers’. The program also decreases the PBI and all its sub-
components significantly. The PBI and all its subcomponents for the treatment
group mothers’ children are on an average 2-3% lower than those of the control
group mothers’. The F statistic for the TOT is significant enough and does not
point to weak instruments. These values are presented in column 5 of Table 1.6.
The impact of the program on the mother though is positive. Assignment to the
program increases the mothers’ education level (significant at 5%) and also leads to
higher earnings for the mother. It also leads to the mother providing a better home
environment for the child as shown by the increase in the HOME score for mothers’
who were in the treatment group. Since not all mothers’ selected for the program
participated fully in it, we try to measure the impact of an additional hour of the
program on BBCS, BPI, PBI and the school performance.
Yij = θo + θ1hoursij + θ2Xij + δj + ςij (1.3.5)
where
hoursij = φo + φ1Zij + φ2Xij + δj + ξij (1.3.6)
Results are presented in Table 1.7. Since mothers’ in the treatment group were
supposed to attend the program for 20-30 hours per week for 18 months, we also
calculate the total impact of the mother attending the program for an average of 25
hours per week in column 4 of Table 1.7. These results also indicate that mothers’
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participation in the program is decreasing the childs’ cognitive score and increasing
their behavioral problems.
1.4 Conclusions
We do not find any significant impact of investment in mothers’ human capital have
little impact on the cognitive and behavioral outcomes of their pre school children.
The magnitudes of the effects through various channels like mothers’ education,
earnings and home score, are generally small, insignificant and are also likely to
be of ’wrong’ signs. However caution should be taken in generalizing them since
these results are for a very select disadvantaged group of mothers’ and seem to be
driven by the problem of weak instruments. It is also possible that the effect of the
program on the children was experienced with a lag and since there was no followup
after 42 months we do not see any significant impact. Given the counterintutive
signs we see on the impact of the mothers’ variables on child outcomes, one area
of further research this points to is the effects of reforms targeting mothers’ self
suffciency on the children.
1.5 Tables
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Percent mothers’ with higher than grade10 completed at baseline 0.34 0.47 0 1 1842
Test of Adult Basic Education score 746.22 41.68 480 844 1836
Age of mother at baseline 18.82 1.35 16 22 1840
Mothers’ age at first birth 16.82 1.37 13 19 1840
Percent black 0.55 0.5 0 1 1842
Percent hispanic/others 0.25 0.43 0 1 1842
Dad with family at age 14 0.27 0.45 0 1 1842
Percent mothers’ with family never on welfare when young 0.36 0.48 0 1 1825
Age of child > 18 months at baseline 0.43 0.5 0 1 1841
Percent with male child 0.52 0.5 0 1 1842
At least one parent high school graduate or more 0.49 0.5 0 1 1842
Mothers’ CESD depression score at baseline 17.98 10.22 0 54 1838
BBCS 6.74 2.87 1 19 1754
BPI 109.43 13.42 68 145 1807
17
Table 1.2: Mean Comparison Tests
Variable Control Treatment Diff p value N C N T
Percent mothers’ with higher than grade10 completed at baseline 0.33 0.35 -0.02 0.45 609 1233
Test of Adult Basic Education score 745.48 746.58 -1.09 0.6 607 1229
Age of mother at baseline 18.82 18.82 -0.01 0.92 608 1232
Percent black 0.56 0.54 0.03 0.3 609 1233
Percent hispanic/others 0.24 0.26 -0.02 0.47 609 1233
Dad present at age 14 0.27 0.28 -0.01 0.8 609 1233
Percent mothers’ with family never on welfare when young 0.34 0.37 -0.03 0.24 602 1223
Age of child >18 months at baseline 0.45 0.42 0.02 0.34 608 1233
Percent with male child 0.51 0.53 -0.02 0.37 609 1233
At least one parent high school graduate or more 0.52 0.48 0.04 0.15 609 1233
Mothers’ CESD depression score at baseline 18.38 17.78 0.6 0.24 607 1231
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Table 1.3: OLS and IV: All Sample
Variable BBCS BPI
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother has high school/GED at month 42 0.477*** -1.083 -0.088 15.971
(0.154) (1.876) (0.746) (11.228)
Mother has some college credits at month 42 0.694*** 0.183 -0.913 4.648
(0.216) (1.709) (1.035) (9.837)
Home score at month 42 0.058*** 0.103 -0.242*** 0.053
(0.007) (0.090) (0.033) (0.488)
Mother earns $500 or more between months 31-42 0.113 -0.115 -0.249 -12.304
(0.133) (1.524) (0.640) (7.653)
Mother has higher than grade10 completed at baseline 0.368** 0.487 0.297 -0.988
(0.148) (0.314) (0.710) (1.654)
Mothers TABE score at baseline 0.007*** 0.010** -0.009 -0.044
(0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.031)
Age of mother at baseline 0.012 0.000 0.214 0.153
(0.054) (0.062) (0.256) (0.359)
Black Dummy -0.550*** -0.472 -3.526*** -2.815
(0.211) (0.444) (1.025) (2.230)
Hispanic Dummy -0.674*** -0.672*** -2.633** -2.231
(0.214) (0.249) (1.037) (1.406)
Mothers’ dad stayed with her at age 14 -0.043 -0.145 -1.345* -1.592
(0.152) (0.200) (0.736) (1.056)
Mothers’ family never on welfare when young 0.223 0.274 -0.235 -1.284
(0.141) (0.202) (0.686) (1.154)
Standard error in parenthesis, covariates include family background and demographic variables
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Variable BBCS BPI
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother ever married at baseline -0.248 -0.299 0.839 0.173
(0.237) (0.269) (1.143) (1.543)
Age of child gt >18 months at baseline 0.035 -0.071 -1.329** -2.263
(0.139) (0.334) (0.677) (1.873)
Male Child -0.481*** -0.427** 0.481 0.455
(0.127) (0.168) (0.615) (0.911)
At least one grandparent has completed high school -0.079 -0.073 0.807 0.156
(0.133) (0.188) (0.640) (1.063)
Mothers’ CESD depression score at baseline -0.007 -0.004 0.226*** 0.254***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.031) (0.053)
Constant -4.702*** -10.532 135.665*** 130.981***
(1.721) (6.792) (8.258) (34.703)
Site Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1734 1734 1784 1784
Standard error in parenthesis, covariates include family background and demographic variables
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 1.4: OLS and IV: Black, White and Hispanic
Variable BBCS BPI
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Black
Mother has high school/GED at month 42 0.389* -1.602 -0.179 14.251
(0.217) (1.842) (1.003) (9.087)
Mother has some college credits at month 42 0.386 1.014 -0.972 3.229
(0.301) (1.965) (1.377) (9.103)
Home score at month 42 0.075*** 0.165** -0.162*** -0.232
(0.010) (0.083) (0.044) (0.366)
Mother earns $500 or more between months 31-42 0.078 1.383 -0.127 -10.486
(0.188) (1.541) (0.865) (6.983)
Observations 938 938 968 968
Panel B: White
Mother has high school/GED at month 42 0.750** -5.391 1.138 -37.853
(0.339) (6.360) (1.773) (39.820)
Mother has some college credits at month 42 0.776 10.575 -0.603 43.787
(0.526) (8.626) (2.735) (49.748)
Home score at month 42 0.047*** 0.059 -0.394*** 0.033
(0.015) (0.205) (0.079) (1.117)
Mother earns $500 or more between months 31-42 -0.168 3.068 0.030 4.553
(0.295) (3.688) (1.531) (20.224)
Observations 362 362 363 363
Panel C: Hispanic
Mother has high school/GED at month 42 0.224 -4.049 -1.285 12.537
(0.300) (4.443) (1.661) (25.698)
Mother has some college credits at month 42 1.078*** -0.381 -1.643 -12.049
(0.392) (4.181) (2.181) (19.742)
Home score at month 42 0.020 0.242 -0.275*** -0.787
(0.013) (0.260) (0.074) (1.082)
Mother earns $500 or more between months 31-42 0.536** -1.516 -0.413 15.641
(0.253) (2.858) (1.396) (15.469)
Observations 402 402 415 415
All regressions include covariates and site fixed effects
Standard error in parenthesis, covariates include family background and demographic variables
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 1.5: OLS and IV: Child’s age gt/lt 18 months
Variable BBCS BPI
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Focal Child ≥ 18 months
Mother has high school/GED at month 42 0.081 2.390 -1.380 4.044
(0.251) (2.620) (1.166) (12.171)
Mother has some college credits at month 42 0.259 1.296 -1.201 7.427
(0.343) (2.461) (1.557) (10.192)
Home score at month 42 0.057*** 0.121 -0.275*** -0.042
(0.011) (0.076) (0.051) (0.344)
Mother earns $500 or more between months 31-42 0.229 -1.379 -1.077 -6.523
(0.209) (2.264) (0.968) (8.895)
Observations 716 716 767 767
Panel A: Focal Child < 18 months
Mother has high school/GED at month 42 0.639*** -3.061 0.958 18.218*
(0.194) (2.316) (0.987) (10.806)
Mother has some college credits at month 42 0.997*** -0.771 -0.543 1.836
(0.279) (3.359) (1.408) (15.536)
Home score at month 42 0.057*** 0.201 -0.217*** -0.135
(0.009) (0.129) (0.044) (0.599)
Mother earns $500 or more between months 31-42 0.151 0.975 0.268 -9.483
(0.172) (1.754) (0.870) (7.546)
Observations 1018 1018 1017 1017
All regressions include covariates and site fixed effects
Standard error in parenthesis, covariates include family background and demographic variables
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 1.6: Intent to Treat and Treatment on the Treated
Variable Control
group
mean
ITT Naive
TOT
TOT F Statis-
tic
N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BBCS 6.836 -0.206 -0.147 -0.231 5008.192 1,734
(0.139) (0.135) (0.154)
BPI 108.489 1.562** 1.418** 1.752** 5123.908 1,784
(0.661) (0.639) (0.735)
BPI-Anxious/ Depressed 105.722 1.694*** 1.327** 1.897*** 5243.647 1,805
(0.579) (0.561) (0.644)
BPI-Antisocial 109.978 0.525 0.759 0.589 5149.509 1,788
(0.717) (0.694) (0.797)
BPI-Dependent 108.156 0.956 0.787 1.071 5235.125 1,804
(0.629) (0.609) (0.699)
BPI-Headstrong 102.317 0.368 0.596 0.413 5196.83 1,806
(0.580) (0.561) (0.645)
BPI-Hyperactive 107.826 1.530** 1.234* 1.714** 5205.323 1,807
(0.670) (0.649) (0.745)
BPI-Peerconflict 105.982 2.021*** 1.912*** 2.264*** 5240.513 1,804
(0.670) (0.649) (0.745)
PBI 197.382 -4.563*** -3.919** -5.114*** 5177.658 1,792
(1.635) (1.584) (1.819)
PBI-Autonomous 43.394 -0.905*** -0.596* -1.015*** 5216.33 1,800
(0.335) (0.325) (0.373)
PBI-Compliant 63.259 -2.165*** -1.868** -2.427*** 5177.658 1,792
(0.765) (0.741) (0.851)
PBI-Sensitive 90.71 -1.469** -1.427** -1.646** 5186.636 1,794
(0.724) (0.701) (0.805)
School Performance 8.341 -0.127 -0.079 -0.144 1937.192 780
(0.152) (0.146) (0.169)
Mother has high school/GED at month 42 0.038* 1,819
(0.023)
Mother has some college credits at month 42 0.036** 1,819
(0.016)
Mother earns $500 or more between months
31-42
0.007 1,819
(0.024)
Home score at month 42 0.287 1,761
(0.492)
All regressions include covariates and site fixed effects
Standard error in parenthesis, covariates include family background and demographic variables
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 1.7: IV: Number of New Chance Hours
Variable Mean of
group
with zero
hours
OLS Es-
timates
IV of
hours
at the
program
1800
hours
F Statis-
tic
N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BBCS 6.727 0.0005** -0.001 -1.8 547.635 1734
(0.000) (0.000)
BPI 108.647 0.001 0.005** 9 572.265 1784
(0.001) (0.002)
BPI-Anxious/ Depressed 106.019 -0.000 0.005*** 9 577.775 1805
(0.001) (0.002)
BPI-Antisocial 109.831 0.001 0.002 3.6 575.002 1788
(0.001) (0.002)
BPI-Dependent 108.37 0.0003 0.003 5.4 575.043 1804
(0.001) (0.002)
BPI-Headstrong 102.127 0.0002 0.001 1.8 575.164 1806
(0.001) (0.002)
BPI-Hyperactive 108.068 0.001 0.005** 9 576.619 1807
(0.001) (0.002)
BPI-Peerconflict 106.279 0.001 0.006*** 10.8 577.549 1804
(0.001) (0.002)
PBI 196.556 -0.0002 -0.014*** -25.2 571.468 1792
(0.003) (0.005)
PBI-Autonomous 43.129 0.0003 -0.003*** -5.4 572.618 1800
(0.001) (0.001)
PBI-Compliant 62.891 -0.001 -0.007*** -12.6 571.468 1792
(0.001) (0.002)
PBI-Sensitive 90.522 0.000 -0.005** -9 569.956 1794
(0.001) (0.002)
School Performance 8.294 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.72 269.528 780
(0.000) (0.000)
All regressions include covariates and site fixed effects
Standard error in parenthesis, covariates include family background and demographic variables
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
24
Table 1.8: Distribution across sites
Site Control Treatment Total
Allentown 35 67 102
Bronx 39 84 123
Chicago 16 38 54
Chulavista 38 71 109
Denver 32 63 95
Detroit 53 101 154
Harlem 38 73 111
Inglewood 41 78 119
Jacksonville 40 88 128
Lexington 43 73 116
Minneapolis 34 70 104
Philadelphia 44 85 129
Pittsburgh 48 103 151
Portland 38 87 125
Salem 31 69 100
San Jose 39 83 122
25
Table 1.9: First Stage F Statistics
Variable Mother
has high
school/GED
at month
42
Mother
has some
college
credits at
month 42
Home
score at
month 42
Mother
earns
> 500
or more
between
months
31-42
BBCS all 0.37 1.3 0.48 0.95
(0.96) (0.23) (0.91) (0.49)
BPI all 0.39 1.16 0.37 0.94
(0.95) (0.32) (0.96) (0.5)
Focal Child Age gt 18 months BBCS 0.54 0.64 0.62 1.3
(0.9) (0.82) (0.84) (0.21)
Focal Child Age gt 18 months BPI 0.61 0.63 0.65 1.22
(0.84) (0.82) (0.81) (0.26)
Focal Child Age lt 18 months BBCS 1.19 1.89 1.16 1.74
(0.27) (0.02) (0.29) (0.04)
Focal Child Age lt 18 months BPI 1.35 1.95 1.06 1.6
(0.17) (0.02) (0.39) (0.07)
Black BBCS 0.74 0.86 0.63 1.39
(0.76) (0.62) (0.86) (0.14)
Black BPI 0.8 0.85 0.63 1.3
(0.69) (0.62) (0.86) (0.19)
White BBCS 0.61 1.79 1.37 1.38
(0.88) (0.03) (0.15) (0.14)
White BPI 0.74 1.65 1.33 1.18
(0.75) (0.05) (0.17) (0.28)
Hispanic BBCS 0.9 1.65 0.75 1.7
(0.57) (0.05) (0.74) (0.04)
Hispanic BPI 1.14 1.61 0.66 1.53
(0.31) (0.06) (0.83) (0.08)
p values in parenthesis
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Chapter 2
Personality and Entrepreneurship
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is an important area of research in economics. According to Hip-
ple (2010) : In 2009, 15.3 million individuals were self-employed, including both
those who had incorporated their businesses and those who did not. The self-
employment rate, which is the proportion of total employment made up of the self-
employed, was 10.9 percent. Entrepreneurship is seen as essential for an economy
to grow and flourish. Entrepreneurial activity is usually seen as integral step to-
ward innovation and globalization. According to UNCTAD: Entrepreneurs produce
solutions that fly in the face of established knowledge, and they always challenge the
status quo. They are risk-takers who pursue opportunities that others may fail to
recognize or may even view as problems or threats. Whatever the definition of en-
trepreneurship, it is closely associated with change, creativity, knowledge, innovation
and flexibility-factors that are increasingly important sources of competitiveness in
an increasingly globalized world economy. Thus, fostering entrepreneurship means
promoting the competitiveness of businesses.
Economists have long examined various aspects of entrepreneurship. Using data
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from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Quadrini (1999) finds that there is a
marked concentration of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs and that entrepreneurs
experience greater upward mobility than workers. Simultaneously, researchers claim
that non-availability of the required funds is one of the main constraints that the
potential entrepreneurs face(Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994).
Wealthier households are more likely to start a business. Paulson and Townsend
(2004) conclude that financial constraints serve an important role in determining
the shape of the patterns of entrepreneurship in Thailand. Paulson et al. (2006)
estimate a model in which the choice between entrepreneurship and wage work may
be influenced by financial market imperfections. They conclude that moral hazard is
the key financial constraint that restricts entrepreneurship in Thailand. Literature
examining the earnings differential between self-employed and paid workers points
out that even though paid workers on an average earn more than self-employed
people, self-employed have greater job satisfaction. Evans and Leighton (1989) con-
clude that their results are consistent with the disadvantage theory which views
entrepreneurs as misfits cast off from wage work. According to them people who
switch from wage work to self employment tend to be people who were receiving rel-
atively low wages, who have changed jobs frequently, and who experience relatively
frequent or long spells of unemployment as wage workers. Hamilton (2000) examines
reasons for earnings differentials between paid employment and entrepreneurship.
He finds that entrepreneurs have both lower initial earnings and lower earnings
growth than in paid employment. His conclusion is that the differential cannot be
explained by the selection of low-ability employees into self-employment, instead the
self-employment earnings differential reflects entrepreneurs’ willingness to sacrifice
substantial earnings in exchange for the non-pecuniary benefits of owning a busi-
31
ness. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) conclude that the self-employed have higher
levels of job and life satisfaction than employees. Most of this literature concludes
that self-employed people earn less than wage workers but have higher levels of job
satisfaction.
One of the reasons for entrepreneurship has been called the intergenerational
pick up rate with respect to self employment by Hout and Rosen (2000). They
conclude that the primary factor affecting an individuals self employment is the self
employment status of his or her father. The nature vs. nurture debate is an ongoing
one in entrepreneurship. Thus family background (nurture) has been examined as
a reason for self employment. More recently researchers have ventured into the field
of behavioral genetics (nature) as a possible explanation for people venturing into
entrepreneurship. The ACE model that divides an observed trait into a genetic com-
ponent (A), a shared environmental component (C), and a unique environmental
component (E), has been used here. Recently, Nicolaou and colleagues (Nicolaou &
Shane,2009; Nicolaou, Shane, Cherkas, Hunkin, & Spector, 2008; Nicolaou,Shane,
Cherkas, & Spector, 2008 and Zhang et al. 2009) have conceptually argued, and
have provided empirical evidence for a genetic underpinning of entrepreneurship.
Thus, the question examining why people choose self-employment is central to eco-
nomic research on entrepreneurship. There is not yet a consensus on this question.
Researchers have examined several possible explanations including being your own
boss (Hamilton 2000), race (Fairlie and Robb 2007) and gender (Devine 1994). The
relation between cognitive ability and labor market outcomes has long been studied
(Boissiere et al. 1985; Cawley et al. 2001; Murnane et al. 1995). More recently the
importance of non-cognitive ability on labor market outcomes has also been docu-
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mented (Bowles et al. 2001; Goldsmith et al. 1997; Heckman et al. 2006). This
paper attempts to examine the relation between non cognitive abilities as measured
by the big five personality traits and self employment.
Most of the existing research on personality and occupation has been on the
lines of either personality and preferences or personality and performance. The
personality and preference literature looks at why different people enter different
occupations. This literature studies the relationship between individual tastes and
preferences and the occupation in which an individual finds employment. Hence an
individual chooses to go into an occupation that provides her satisfaction. One of the
earlier papers in this literature is by Filer (1986) who uses personality and tastes to
predict which of five broadly defined occupational groups an individual will enter.
Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2010) investigate the role of non-cognitive skills in the
occupational segregation of young workers entering the U.S. labor market. They find
entry into male-dominated fields of study and male-dominated occupations are both
related to the extent to which individuals believe they are intelligent and have male
traits while entry into male-dominated occupations is also related to the willingness
to work hard, impulsivity, and the tendency to avoid problems. Using an assignment
model Borghans et al. (2006) show that people are most productive in jobs that
match their style and earn less when they have to shift to other jobs. Krueger and
Schkade (2008) show that workers who are more gregarious, based on their behavior
off the job, tend to be employed in jobs that involve more social interactions. The
literature on personality and performance works on the assumption that people
choose jobs where the returns to their personality type would be the highest. In
this literature a job is usually a source of income and people tend to go for go
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for jobs that provide the highest compensation to their personality type. Fortin
(2008) examines the impact of four non-cognitive traits: self-esteem, external locus
of control, the importance of money/work and the importance of people/ family
on wages and on the gender wage gap. He finds that gender differences in these
non-cognitive factors, especially the importance of money/work, have a modest but
significant role in accounting for the gender wage gap. Urzua (2008) finds that
the effects of non cognitive ability on schooling decisions, hourly wages and annual
hours worked are are uniformly stronger for blacks than whites. In this paper we
try to bring these two literatures together by estimating the impact of personality
traits on the choice to be self employed as well as on the entrepreneurship income.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 is a literature survey on the
big five personality traits and their importance in the psychology and more recently
in the economics literature, section 3 presents the model along with the estimation
strategy, the dataset used along with summary statistics is presented in section 4,
results are in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Background Literature
The importance of personality traits has been revealed by the inability of cognitive
ability to predict certain outcomes. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) use evidence
from the General Education Development (GED) testing program to demonstrate
the importance of personality traits. The level of cognitive ability of GED recipients
is the same as high school graduates who do not go on to college as measured by
scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT). Controlling for cognitive abil-
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ity, GED recipients have lower hourly wages than high school dropouts. GED recip-
ients also have higher job turnover rates, and are more likely to drop out of the army
and post secondary schooling (Heckman and LaFontaine 2010). Heckman, Stixrud,
and Urzua (2006) find that the power of the personality traits equals or exceeds
the predictive power of cognitive traits for schooling, occupational choice, wages,
health behaviors, teenage pregnancy and crime. Additionally Heckman, Stixrud,
and Urzua (2006) and Judge and Hurst (2007) show that among participants in the
NLSY 1979 cohort, positive self-evaluations measured in young adulthood (with
positive self-evaluations of self-esteem, locus of control, and related traits) predict
income in mid-life and, further, enhance the benefits of family socioeconomic status,
and academic achievement on mid-life income.
Personality researchers have proposed that there are five basic dimensions of
personality. These five factors have been known as the Big Five since Goldberg
(1971). Based on the research by Goldberg (1981, 1993) and McCrae and Costa
(1987, 1997), these five categories are usually described as follows:
1. Extraversion: This trait includes characteristics such as excitability, sociabil-
ity, talkativeness, assertiveness, and high amounts of emotional expressiveness.
2. Agreeableness: This personality dimension includes attributes such as trust,
altruism, kindness, affection, and other pro-social behaviors.
3. Conscientiousness: Common features of this dimension include high levels of
thoughtfulness, with good impulse control and goal-directed behaviors. Those
high in conscientiousness tend to be organized and mindful of details.
4. Neuroticism: Individuals high in this trait tend to experience emotional in-
35
stability, anxiety, moodiness, irritability, and sadness.
5. Openness: This trait features characteristics such as imagination and insight,
and those high in this trait also tend to have a broad range of interests.
These factors represent personality at a broad level of aggregation. This cat-
egorization does not imply that all personality attributes can be fully reduced to
five traits. Each factor summarizes a large number of distinct, more specific, per-
sonality characteristics. To provide a better idea of what they are, in Table 2.1 we
list a number of characteristics related to each of the five personality dimensions.
Research demonstrates that these factors and facets are generally stable across the
lifespan (Roberts & DelVecchio 2000). According to Sutin et al. (2009) when mea-
sured concurrently, controlling for sex, ethnicity, age and education, personality was
associated with income and job satisfaction: Emotionally stable and conscientious
participants reported earning higher incomes and reported more satisfaction with
their jobs. The Big Five have been used extensively in psychology literature to
predict labor market and social outcomes (Barrick et al. 1993; Groves 2005; Kanfer
et al. 2001). Judge et al. (1999) report a near consensus in the organizational psy-
chology literature that out of these five traits conscientiousness, extraversion, and
neuroticism are most relevant to job performance. Psychology literature also has
substantial evidence on the importance of personality traits in predicting socioe-
conomic outcomes including job performance, health, and academic achievement
(Barrick and Mount 1991; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham 2005; Hampson et al.
2006; Hogan, Hogan, and Roberts 1996; Hogan and Holland 2003; Robbins et al.
2006; Roberts et al. 2007, Ones et al. 2007; Schmidt and Hunter 1998).
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More recently economists have also started using these traits to predict various
outcomes. Heineck (2011) analyses British Household Panel Survey data using the
five factor model to examine the relationship between individuals’ personality and
wages in the UK. He finds a negative linear relationship between wages and agree-
ableness and, for females, wages and neuroticism whereas openness to experience is
rewarded. Anger and Heineck (2010) do a joint analysis of the relationship between
cognitive skills, personality traits and earnings in Germany. They find that person-
ality is an important predictor of earnings even if a large set of socio-demographic
and job-related characteristics and, even more relevant, cognitive ability scores are
included. Mueller and Plug (2006) use the Five-Factor Model of personality struc-
ture to explore how personality affects the earnings of a large group of men and
women. They find that all five basic traits: extroversion, agreeableness, consci-
entiousness, neuroticism and openness to experience had statistically significant
positive or negative earnings effects, and together they appear to have had effects
comparable to those commonly found for cognitive ability. Using data from the
military enlistment for a large representative sample of Swedish men, Lindqvist and
Vestman (2011) find strong evidence that men who fare badly in the labor market
in the sense of long-term unemployment or low annual earnings lack non-cognitive
but not cognitive ability.
However, still the links between measures of personality and preferences are
largely unexplored. Do preferences causally effect personality? Does personality
causally effect preferences? Or are both effected from other parameters? Some
aspects of personality may be reflecting preferences. For example, Openness to Ex-
perience might relate to a preference for learning, and Extraversion might reflect
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a preference for social interactions. There have been few studies that empirically
investigate the link between preference and personality. The most examined facets
of preferences are time preference, risk aversion and leisure. Daly, Delaney and Har-
mon (2009) find that financial discounting is related to a range of psychological vari-
ables including consideration of future consequences, self-control,conscientiousness,
extraversion, and experiential avoidance. Borghans, Meijers and ter Weel (2008)
examine whether non-cognitive skills, measured both by personality traits and by
economic preference parameters, influence cognitive tests’ performance. Their ba-
sic idea is that non-cognitive skills might affect the effort people put into a test to
obtain good results. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. (2010) conclude that Openness
to Experience and Agreeableness are related to risk aversion. Borghans, Golsteyn,
Heckman et al. (2009) show that risk-aversion is positively associated with Neu-
roticism, which contains measures of fear and strong emotional responses to bad
outcomes. They also find that Agreeableness is positively associated with risk aver-
sion. Anderson, Burks, DeYoung et al. (2011) find that Neuroticism is positively
associated with risk aversion but only for lotteries over gains not losses.(Find Cita-
tion) Barsky, Juster, Kimball et al. (1997) measure risk tolerance, time preference,
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and find that risk tolerance predicts
smoking and drinking, holding insurance and stock, and decisions to immigrate and
be self-employed.
The relation between personality and entrepreneurship has also been examined
both in the psychology and economics literature. We would expect individuals to be
attracted to entrepreneurship based on the self-perceived match between their own
personality traits and the task demands of entrepreneurship. By the same logic,
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we expect people who have more of the personality traits associated with the en-
trepreneurial role to be more successful entrepreneurs. Using meta-analytical tech-
niques to examine the relationship between personality and entrepreneurial status,
Zhao and Seibert (2006) conclude that entrepreneurs are higher on conscientious-
ness, emotional stability, and openness to experience and are lower on agreeableness
than non-entrepreneur managers. In a more recent study Zhao et al. (2010) find
that openness to experience and conscientiousness appear to be the personality con-
structs most strongly and consistently associated to both entrepreneurial intentions
and entrepreneurial performance. They claim that personality plays a role both in
the intention to become an entrepreneur and success as an entrepreneur. On sim-
ilar lines Rauch and Frese (2007) find that the traits matched to entrepreneurship
significantly correlated with entrepreneurial behavior (business creation, business
success) were need for achievement, generalized self-efficacy, innovativeness, stress
tolerance, need for autonomy, and proactive personality.
2.3 Empirical Framework
In this section we develop the empirical framework relating personality traits to
performance and preferences for entrepreneurship. Our approach is based on the
Roy (1951) model of occupational choice in which individuals sort themselves across
sectors based on relative abilities. We follow Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006)
who extend the Roy model to incorporate psychological variables that affect occupa-
tional choice and performance.1 Individuals will choose entrepreneurship in a given
1Almlund et al (2011) develop a generalized version of the Roy model incorporating personality
traits, multiple tasks, goals, and effort. Their model informs the approach taken here.
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period if the expected utility from self-employment is greater than that of wage
work. Since our data sample will consist of prime-age males, we do not consider a
non-employment option, although this could easily be introduced. Utility in each
sector is a function of income as well as preferences for non-wage attributes asso-
ciated with the sector. For example, these preferences would include the desire to
“be your own boss” in self-employment. We write the utility from self-employment,
ViSE, as:
ViSE = αyiSE + δSEPi + ZiγSE + ηiSE (2.3.1)
where yiSE is a measure of income if the individuals is self-employed in the current
period, Pi is a vector of the personality traits of individual i that affect the utility
associated with entrepreneurship, Zi is a vector of other observed individual char-
acteristics that affect utility, such as education, and ηiSE are unobserved (to the
econometrician) factors that influence utility. We specify a similar equation for the
utility associated with paid employment:
ViPE = αyiPE + δPEPi + ZiγPE + ηiPE (2.3.2)
At the start of the period, an individual will choose to be an entrepreneur if the
expected utility from self-employment is greater than that from paid employment;
he will choose paid employment if the opposite is true. Let the index I∗i be the
difference in the expected utilities across sectors:
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I∗i = E[ViSE]− E[ViPE]
= α(E[yiSE]− E[yiPE]) + (δSE − δPE)Pi + Zi(γSE − γPE) + (ηiSE − ηiPE)
(2.3.3)
Equation (2.3.3) implies that individuals do not know their self-employment (or
paid employment) income when making their employment decision, but do know
their preferences for the non-wage attributes of each sector. Individuals are thus
observed to be self-employed, denoted by Ii = 1, if I
∗
i > 0, and are paid employees
if I∗i ≤ 0 (Ii = 0). Since choice is based on relative utility, we are only able to
recover differences in the parameters in equation (2.3.3), which we rewrite as:
I∗i = E[ViSE]− E[ViPE]
= α(E[yiSE]− E[yiPE]) + δPi + Ziγ + ηi
(2.3.4)
Turning to performance, we specify the sectoral annual income equations as:
yiSE = XiβSE + piSEPi + εiSE (2.3.5)
and
yiPE = XiβPE + piPEPi + εiPE (2.3.6)
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The vector Xi include factors thought to influence productivity and income, such
as experience. The error terms εiSE and εiPE represent shocks to sectoral returns
that are not known by individual i when he chooses whether to be an entrepreneur
at the start of the period. The parameter vectors piSE and piPE are of particular
interest since they measure the impact of personality traits in self-employment and
paid-employment, respectively.
The goal of this study is to distinguish the impact of personality traits on la-
bor market performance, as given by piSE and piPE, from the relationship between
personality and preferences for entrepreneurship, as given by δ. Prior studies of the
relationship between personality and occupational choice generally do not estimate
a structural probit model like equation (2.3.4) that explicitly incorporates expected
earnings. Instead, studies typically estimate a reduced-form probit model that sub-
stitutes the expected values of equations (2.3.5) and (2.3.6) to generate a model of
the form:
I∗i = α((XiβSE + piSEPi)− (XiβPE + piPEPi)) + δPi + Ziγ + ηi
= (αpiSE − αpiPE + δ)Pi + Xi(αβSE − αβSE) + Ziγ + ηi
= τPi + Xiκ + Ziγ + ηi
(2.3.7)
As is clear from equation (2.3.7), the coefficient vector τ associated with Pi re-
covered from the reduced-form probit model reflects both the performance and
preference implications of personality traits. For example, suppose that estimation
of the reduced-form probit model (2.3.7) shows that individuals with higher lev-
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els of conscientiousness are more likely to be entrepreneurs. It is unclear whether
this reflects a greater impact of conscientiousness on entrepreneurial performance
(e.g., piSE > piPE), or stronger preference for the non-pecuniary aspects of self-
employment among these individuals (e.g., δ > 0), or both. By focusing on the
estimation of equation (2.3.4), we will be able to distinguish between these alterna-
tive explanations.
Estimation of equation (2.3.4) requires specification of individual i’s expected
return in each sector, E[yiSE] and E[yiPE]. Since individuals may non-randomly sort
into paid employment and self-employment, simple OLS estimation of the sectoral
income equations (2.3.5) and (2.3.6) may yield biased estimates of the parameters
piSE, piPE, βSE, and βPE if the unobserved (by the researcher) factors influencing
income, εiSE and εiPE, are correlated with the unobserved preference component ηi.
Consequently, we estimate equations (2.3.4) and (2.3.5) incorporating inverse mills-
ratios generated from equation (2.3.6) to account for potential self-selection, which
allows us to recover unbiased estimates of sectoral income equation parameters.
These parameters will be used to construct the individual’s expected difference in
sectoral returns, E[yiSE]− E[yiPE], which is then included in the structural probit
model (2.3.4) as a regressor.
2.4 Data
The data for this paper is from The Midlife Development in the United States
(MIDUS) carried out in 1994/95 by the MacArthur Midlife Research Network. The
first wave of data collection (MIDUS I) began in 1995 and did a national survey
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of over 7, 000 Americans aged 25 to 74. The main data collection consisted of a
general population survey, as well as surveys of siblings of the general population
respondents, and a twin pairs sample. The MIDUS II project was designed to collect
a second wave of data on the same respondents approximately 10 years later. In
addition to the national probability sample (N = 3485), the study included over-
samples in select metropolitan areas (N = 757), a sample of siblings (N = 951)
of the main respondents, and a national sample of twin pairs (N = 1914). The
purpose of the study was to investigate the role of behavioral, psychological, and
social factors in understanding age-related differences in physical and mental health.
The study collected extensive information on the personality traits as well as the
socioeconomic characteristics of the sample. We use this data from both the waves
to examine the relation between the personality traits and self employment decision
as well as success. The analysis was done on the male working subpopulation aged
65 or less to avoid modelling the decision to work for women. Since data for only a
subsample of the people interviewed in 1995 was collected in 2004, our final sample
is for 1100 males.
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of the sample for 2004. In Table 2.3,
we present the t-tests to see the difference in the type of people choosing self em-
ployment vs. paid employment. The MIDUS male working sample is around 50
years of age in 2004 with an annual income of $70, 000. 79% of them are married
and the average male has 3 children in 2004. In terms of education 4% of them
have a GED or lower, 20% are high school graduates, 26% have some college and
49% have a graduate degree or higher. In 2004 22% of the sample is self employed.
We did some t-tests for the difference between self employed and paid employees
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for 2004. Self employed people are significantly older than paid employees. Edu-
cation wise there is no significant difference between the two groups in 2004. The
self employed have a higher annual income while there is no significant difference
between the proportion of people married and the number of children. Results are
presented in Table 2.3. In the same table we also present the t-tests for the differ-
ence in personality between self employed and paid employees in our sample. Self
employed people score higher on the extraversion and openness to experience.
2.5 Results
We begin our analysis by estimating the reduced-form probit model of self-employment
choice in 2004 given by equation (2.3.7). The model includes the standard set of
demographic variables, such as age and education, the Big 5 personality measures,
and a rich set of family background variables that are available in the MIDUS
data, including father’s and mother’s education, whether the father and mother
were present in the home when the individual was 14 years old, and whether the
father and mother had been self-employed when the individual was growing up.
Similar to prior studies incorporating personality characteristics, Table 2.4 shows
that individuals who are more open to new experiences are significantly more likely
to be entrepreneurs in 2004. While agreeableness and neuroticism have a negative
effect on self-employment, these variables are not statistically significant. Some-
what surprisingly, education is not a significant predictor of self-employment, nor
is age or marital status. One might have expected that more educated or older in-
dividuals would have more access to credit which would increase the probability of
entrepreneurial entry (Evans and Jovanovic 1989). A notable finding is the asymme-
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try in the roles that fathers and mothers play in the likelihood of entrepreneurship.
Having a self-employed father is a strong positive predictor of entrepreneurial choice,
even though the individuals in our sample are on average 50 years old, implying that
the father’s occupational status 35 years ago still affects choice today. Somewhat
surprisingly, having a self-employed mother while growing up has no impact on the
individual’s self-employment choice. One conjecture for this finding is that many
of these mothers may have been working in the family business with the father,
suggesting the father self-employment variable is capturing the impact of growing
up in an ”entrepreneurial” family.
As discussed in Section 3, the estimated coefficients associated with the Big 5
personality variables in the reduced-form probit model presented in Table 2.4 reflect
the relationship of these variables to both performance in self and paid-employment,
as well as preferences for entrepreneurship. We now begin to untangle these 2 sets
of effects. Our next step is to estimate the sectoral income regressions given by
equations (2.3.5) and (2.3.6), including inverse mills-ratio terms generated from
the reduced-form probit estimates. While the model can be identified through the
assumption of joint normality of the error terms, we also incorporate exclusion re-
strictions to aid in identification. In particular, we assume that the father’s and
mother’s self-employment status, as well as whether each was present in the home
when the individual was a child, affects only the decision to be self-employed and
not income as either an entrepreneur or a paid employee. We experimented with
allowing father’s and mother’s self-employment status to enter the income regres-
sions, but neither variable was statistically significant for paid-employees or the
self-employed.
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Estimates of the selection-corrected sectoral income regressions (2.3.5) and
(2.3.6) are presented in Table 2.5. The coefficients on the inverse mills-ratios are
small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that sample selection issues are not a
problem for our estimates. The first column of the table shows that while individu-
als who are more open to new experiences are more likely to choose self-employment,
this personality trait is associated with poorer performance in entrepreneurship, al-
though the coefficient is not statistically significant. Among the other characteris-
tics, extraversion has the strongest positive impact on entrepreneurial performance;
the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. This finding may not
be surprising given that extroversion is associated with higher levels of sociability
and assertiveness. For entrepreneurs who have a high level of interaction with cus-
tomers, funders, and employees, such characteristics may be especially valuable in
increasing sales, raising funding, or encouraging a high degree of employee effort.
By contrast, the estimates in second column of the table suggest that extraversion
does not have a similarly strong effect on performance as a wage worker. It may be
that organizational structure in a larger firm reduces the scope for extraversion to
have an impact.
Studies have found that individuals exhibiting a higher degree of conscientious-
ness are better performers, perhaps reflecting their organized and detail-oriented
natures. We obtain similar results here: more conscientious wage workers earn sig-
nificantly higher pay. The coefficient is even larger in magnitude in self-employment
although it is not statistically significant. Finally, column (2) shows that individuals
who are more trusting and altruistic earn significantly less in paid employment. In
contrast, the agreeableness trait has virtually no impact on entrepreneurial perfor-
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mance, as measured by income.
With regard to other characteristics, comparison of the estimates in columns
(1) and (2) show a much smaller educational gradient for entrepreneurial perfor-
mance as compared to paid employment. For example, the estimates imply that
a college graduate earns approximately 24% more than a high school dropout in
self-employment (and the estimate is not significant), while the college premium
is 55% for paid employees. Other studies have found similar results, and have ar-
gued the difference reflects the idea that education has much less signaling value in
self-employment than in wage work since the entrepreneur knows his or her own pro-
ductivity. It is also notable that the ”marriage premium” is similar across sectors,
perhaps reflecting the spouse’s role in home production that allows the individual
to spend more time in paid work. Finally, family background as measured by the
father’s educational attainment has a significant effect on entrepreneurial income,
but the coefficient estimate is close to zero and insignificant for paid employees.
The final step of our analysis is to use the estimated income coefficients from
Table 2.5 to construct the sectoral difference in expected income for each individual
in the sample, E[yiSE] − E[yiPE], and then include this quantity as an additional
variable in the structural probit model defined by equation (2.3.4). Since we control
for the impact of the personality variables on income by including E[yiSE]−E[yiPE],
the coefficients on the personality variables in the structural probit reflect prefer-
ences for entrepreneurship associated with the Big 5. The estimates of equation
(2.3.4) presented in Table 2.6 show that individuals expecting to earn more in
self-employment are more likely to choose to be entrepreneurs. Consequently, indi-
viduals with traits such as extraversion that have higher returns in self-employment
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than in paid employment will be more likely to become entrepreneurs because of this
performance effect. However, there is no evidence that more extraverted individuals
have a stronger preference for entrepreneurship. Turning to other components of
the Big 5, we once again find that individuals who are more open to new experi-
ences are more likely to be self-employed. In contrast to our reduced form findings
in Table 2.4, by controlling for the expected sectoral income differential we are
now able to interpret this finding as reflecting preference considerations associated
with openness, rather than performance considerations. Finally, more agreeable or
conscientious individuals appear to have less preference for self-employment, per-
haps because of the riskier and more unstructured nature of entrepreneurship, but
again these effects are not statistically significant. Overall, our findings suggest that
individuals who are more open to new experiences have a stronger preference for
entrepreneurship, which may reflect less risk aversion on their part. However, once
self-employed openness does not have a positive impact on entrepreneurial perfor-
mance. On the other hand, individuals who exhibit a greater degree of extraversion
do not appear to have strong preference for self-employment, but if they do start
their own business they are more likely to be successful.
A concern for our analysis is the potential endogeneity of the Big 5 personal-
ity measures. While we allowed for self-selection in the estimation of the sectoral
income equations, it may be the case, for example, that individuals who enter
self-employment become more open to new experiences, rather than vice versa.
One might consider instrumenting for the personality characteristics in the self-
employment choice and sectoral income regressions, it is not clear that five instru-
ments are available in the MIDUS data. Consequently, our approach is to first
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determine whether endogeneity of the Big 5 personality should be of concern.
There is debate in the literature regarding the stability of the Big 5 over an
individual’s life-cycle. While one can imagine that these personality characteristics
might still be forming in adolescence, the question for our findings is whether they
still change in response to environmental factors, such as occupation or income,
after age 25 (the youngest age in our sample). To investigate this possibility, we
use the 1995 data from MIDUS I for our sample members to estimate regressions
of the form:
Pik2004 = κ0k + κ1kSEi1995 + κ2kyi1995 + κ3kPik1995 + Zi1995κ4k + uik2004 (2.5.1)
where Pikt is the k’th personality trait measured in year t, SEi1995 is an indicator
for self-employment status in 1995, and yi1995 is the 1995 income of individual i. The
vector Zi1995 includes the age and educational level of individual i in 1995. The
parameters κ1k and κ2k indicate the extent to which personality characteristics
change in response to self-employment status or income.
Estimates of κ1k, κ2k, and κ3k from equation (2.5.1) for each of the Big 5 per-
sonality characteristics are reported in Table 2.7. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that κ1k = 0 in any of the regressions. In addition, for all of the five personality
characteristics we find no evidence that the measured personality trait is affected
by income. Overall, these estimates give us some confidence that the relationships
that we estimate between the Big 5 and self-employment performance and prefer-
ences for entrepreneurship are not contaminated by endogeneity problems for the
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most part. Individuals do not appear to become more open to new experience in
response to being self-employed, and higher income is not associated with increased
extraversion.
2.6 Conclusion
Recent studies in the entrepreneurship literature have found a relationship between
personality characteristics, as measured by the Big 5, and self-employment choice.
This finding potentially reflects two factors: (a) the impact of personality on per-
formance as an entrepreneur or paid employee; (b) preferences for entrepreneurship
that are related to personality characteristics. For example, laboratory studies
have found that individuals who score higher on the openness to new experiences
dimension are less risk averse. This study attempts to distinguish between these
performance and preference explanations by estimating a structural model of self-
employment choice using data on 1100 adults from the MIDUS survey in the United
States. Our findings confirm that individuals who are more open to new experiences
are more likely to entrepreneurs. However, we find that this reflects preferences for
being self-employed; there is actually a negative, though insignificant, relationship
between openness and entrepreneurial performance. Conversely, we find that more
extroverted individuals (who tend to be more assertive and sociable) tend to be
significantly more successful entrepreneurs, as measured by income. However, ex-
traversion does not appear to affect preferences for self-employment.
Our findings have potentially important implications for public policy toward
entrepreneurship. Providing untargeted subsidies to encourage business formation
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may have the effect of encouraging potentially poor performing individuals to be-
come entrepreneurs. Essentially, such policies may subsidize individuals’ preferences
for entrepreneurship. On the other hand, targeting subsidies at potentially high per-
formers, who our findings suggest have higher levels of extraversion, may be quite
successful in encouraging the entry of higher quality startups. Of course, our paper
only examines one dimension of performance, self-employment income, and it would
be useful to consider other metrics of performance, such as survival or job creation
over time.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Big Five Facets
Characteristic Facet
Openness to Experience Fantasy, Aesthetics, Feelings, Actions, Ideas, Values
Conscientiousness Competence, Order, Dutifulness, Achievement striving, Self-discipline, Deliberation
Extraversion Warmth, Gregariousness, Assertiveness, Activity, Excitement seeking, Positive emotions
Agreeableness Trust, Straightforwardness, Altruism, Compliance, Modesty, Tender-mindedness
Neuroticism (Emotional Stability) Anxiety, Angry hostility, Depression, Self-consciousness, Impulsiveness, Vulnerability
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Deviation observations
2004
Age 49.92 8.01 1110
Self Employed 0.22 0.41 1110
% GED 0.04 0.2 1110
% high school 0.2 0.4 1110
% some college 0.26 0.44 1110
% graduate 0.49 0.5 1110
Income Last Year 69990.35 44806.69 1110
% married 0.79 0.41 1110
Number of Kids 3.18 1.74 1110
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Table 2.3: Self Employed vs Paid Employees
Variable Paid SE Difference p value
2004 Other Variables
Age 49.22 52.49 -3.26 0
% GED 0.04 0.04 0 0.74
% high school 0.21 0.2 0.01 0.73
% some college 0.27 0.24 0.03 0.42
% graduate 0.48 0.52 -0.04 0.26
Income Last Year 68547.86 75247.28 -6699.42 0.04
% married 0.78 0.82 -0.05 0.12
Number of Kids 3.13 3.36 -0.23 0.08
2004 Personality Variables
Agreeableness 3.24 3.28 -0.04 0.34
Extraversion 3.03 3.12 -0.09 0.04
Neuroticism 2.05 1.99 0.06 0.21
Conscientiousness 3.45 3.47 -0.01 0.7
Openess to Experience 2.95 3.04 -0.09 0.01
Observations 871 239
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Table 2.4: Reduced Form Probit Model of Self-Employment Choice
coefficient
Agreeableness 2004 -0.086
(0.101)
Extraversion 2004 0.099
(0.100)
Neuroticism 2004 0.001
(0.074)
Conscientiousness 2004 -0.058
(0.107)
Openess to experience 2004 0.230**
(0.109)
High school 0.098
(0.248)
Some College 0.061
(0.246)
Graduate 0.082
(0.244)
Age 0.026
(0.065)
Age Square 0.000
(0.001)
Married 0.135
(0.112)
Years of Education Father 0.023**
(0.012)
Years of Education Mother 0.003
(0.015)
Father SE 0.379***
(0.103)
Mother SE 0.014
(0.164)
Father present at age 14 -0.425*
(0.233)
Mother present at age 14 0.662
(0.565)
Constant -3.518**
(1.788)
Observations 1107
Standard error in parenthesis
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 2.5: Sectoral (log) Income Regressions
Wage Self Employees Paid Employees
Agreeableness 2004 -0.025 -0.176***
(0.136) (0.044)
Extraversion 2004 0.248* 0.048
(0.138) (0.044)
Neuroticism 2004 0.019 0.030
(0.096) (0.033)
Conscientiousness 2004 0.211 0.099**
(0.143) (0.047)
Openess to experience 2004 -0.184 0.070
(0.175) (0.051)
High School -0.069 0.205**
(0.333) (0.104)
Some College 0.058 0.305***
(0.327) (0.103)
Graduate 0.236 0.553***
(0.320) (0.103)
Age -0.048 0.081***
(0.088) (0.028)
Age Squared 0.001 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Married 0.245 0.229***
(0.159) (0.049)
Years of Education Father 0.039*** 0.006
(0.014) (0.005)
Years of Education Mother 0.013 0.007
(0.020) (0.006)
Constant 10.217*** 8.062***
(2.667) (0.723)
Inverse Mills Ratio -.101 -.095
(0.405) (0.247)
Observations 239 871
Standard error in parenthesis
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Structural Probit Estimates of Self-Employment Choice
coefficient
Difference in Self Employment vs Paid Income 0.498*
(0.260)
Agreeableness 2004 -0.158
(0.106)
Extraversion 2004 -0.013
(0.108)
Neuroticism 2004 0.006
(0.073)
Conscientiousness 2004 -0.109
(0.108)
Openess to experience 2004 0.330***
(0.123)
High School 0.181
(0.243)
Some College 0.096
(0.237)
Graduate 0.171
(0.230)
Age 0.077
(0.072)
Age Squared -0.000
(0.001)
Constant -3.658**
(1.800)
Observations 1110
Standard error in parenthesis
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 2.7: Determinants of Big 5 Personality Characteristics in 2004
Variable Agreeableness
2004
Extraversion
2004
Neuroticism
2004
Conscientiousness
2004
Openess to Ex-
perience 2004
Self Employment in 1995 -0.024 0.025 0.007 0.002 0.042
(0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.027) (0.030)
Income in 1995 -0.013 -0.001 -0.004 0.020 -0.000
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014)
Age 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.004** 0.001 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Agreeableness 1995 0.629***
(0.024)
Extraversion 1995 0.715***
(0.022)
Neuroticism 1995 0.572***
(0.023)
Conscientiousness 1995 0.599***
(0.025)
Openess to Experience 1995 0.704***
(0.025)
Observations 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070
All regressions include age, education dummmies
Standard error in parenthesis
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Chapter 3
Using a Model of Location Around the Clock to
Recover the Amenity Value of Daylight
3.1 Introduction
We investigate how the timing of activities is determined. Rather than focusing
on how much time people devote to some activities, we try to understand at what
specific hours those activities are undertaken. In other words, assuming that in-
dividuals sleep before work and have leisure after it, we basically study work shift
choice. Prominent sociologists such as Presser (2004) have pointed out that wage
premia are very small for night shift workers and thus cannot be a significant de-
terminant of night shift choice. However, the observed wage premia is a difference
between averages computed over highly selected samples. This simple average ig-
nores that night shift workers usually come from the bottom of the conditional wage
distribution (i.e. they have some unobservable characteristics that make them have
lower earnings than otherwise observationally identical workers). In any event, night
shift appears to be a disamenity and it is therefore chosen by people with fewer day
shift opportunities. Building upon the framework outlined by Rosen (1986) which
emphasizes the role of amenities and disamenities on wages, Kostiuk (1990) recog-
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nizes the importance of this selection issue and finds more significant night shift
premia. His analysis resembles that of the classic textbook mover/stayer model
of migration. In fact, one can think of night shift work as a migration decision
where the individual migrates in a temporal rather than a spatial dimension. Then,
it should not come as a surprise that similar tools can be applied for its analysis.
The focus here differs from Kostiuk’s in that we try to emphasize the role of social
interactions in explaining shift choice. In particular, we claim that a distribution of
workers (and jobs) highly concentrated on conventional office hours may arise as a
suboptimal or inefficient equilibrium in an economy with multiple equilibria.
The paper asks the following related questions: When do we work? What’s
the amenity value of day light? Do most people sleep at night because it is dark
or because most other people do that? Assuming that most people demand a
compensating wage differential to supply their labor services at night, how this
premium changes in alternative scenarios in which the share of the population that
works at night is substantially higher? If darkness is not so important should we
all coordinate and work at the same time?
We conjecture that the economy displays multiple equilibria. To the extent that
lack of daylight is not the only determinant of shift premia, the current equilibrium
might be inefficient.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly overviews
related literature in economics and sociology on ”non-standard” work hours. Section
3.3 describes the data and presents descriptive evidence on the prevalence of shift
work as well as estimates of the shift premium that corrects for selection into shift.
Section 3.4 follows the work of Bayer and Timmins (2005, 2007) in developing a
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structural equilibrium sorting model of location around the 24 hour clock that allows
for social interactions in a consistent way. Section 3.5 describes the estimation
strategy and Section 3.6 presents the results and explores willingness to pay for
daylight. Conclusions follow.
3.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, there is the issue of
whether there is a shift premium at all. Modern empirical economists are firmly
rooted in the Rosen (1986) compensating differential framework and so they tend
to see shift work as another job disamenity which should command a premium in a
hedonic equilibrium.1 More sociological perspectives tend to question the existence
of such shift premia.2 However, work by Kostiuk (1990) has showed that comparing
the same occupations and controlling for selection into shift is very important to
identify shift premia.3
Second, since we conjecture that one of the reasons people dislike working at
night has to do with loneliness or the inability to enjoy leisure time jointly with
others, our paper is related to a literature on leisure externalities. In particular,
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) who emphasize the social multiplier effects
of European labor market policies that tend to reduce work hours and increase the
employment rate. Jenkins and Osberg (2005) use British data to document the
1See also Khan (2008).
2See Presser(2004) for a comprehensive analysis of non-standard work hours from a sociological
perspective.
3See also Hwang, Reed and Hubbard (1992) and Hamermesh (1999) for the implications of
unobservables when estimating shift premia.
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important externalities associated with working time decisions. They find that an
individual’s time use choices are contingent on the time use choices of others because
the utility derived from leisure time often benefits from the presence of companions
inside and outside the household.
Given our emphasis on externalities, our paper is also related to a broad litera-
ture on the econometrics of social interactions. This literature surfaces with different
names in different fields of economics: peer effects in education, agglomeration and
congestion effects in urban economics or network externalities in industrial orga-
nization and marketing. Our work is more closely related to Brock and Durlauf
(2001) and in particular, the urban approach of Bayer and Timmins (2005, 2007).
In our model, the utility from choosing a particular location around the clock will
depend on the share of individuals choosing that same clock location.
Finally, an extensive literature on firm task scheduling take positive shift pre-
mia for evening and night shift as given and outlines their implications for the
organization of production and tasks around the clock within firms.4This literature
emphasizes the productive loss implicit in idle capital and the associated distortion
on firm size. Coupled with results from this literature, our estimates could be used
to derive potential welfare gains from moving to a more evenly distributed work
force around the clock. Moreover, the more efficient use of resources would not
limited to the capital stock within productive firms but would also apply to public
infrastructure more generally.5
4See Marris (1964), Georgescu-Roegen (1970), Winston (1974), Betancourt and Clague (1981),
Betancourt (1986). See also Calvo (1975) for a more macroeconomic perspective on capital idleness
and Weiss (1996) for a therethical analysis of synchronization of work schedules.
5Urban planners have envisioned the potential welfare gains from this type of around-the-clock
scenario. See the urban planning literature on ”compact city” spurred by the seminal work of
Dantzig and Saaty (1973).
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3.3 The Data
3.3.1 Decennial Population Census
We rely heavily on publicly available microdata from the Decennial Population
Census of 2000. In particular, we exploit some of the information provided by
the Journey to Work module in the long form questionnaire. The following two
questions allow us to compute measure of shift choice and more generally, measures
of location around the clock.
• At what time you leave to work ?
• How long it takes you to get to work ?
We also exploit standard demographic covariate information available in the
Census including race, gender, marital status, etc. Measures of labor earnings
and hours of work allow us to identify full time workers and construct estimates
of hourly wage. Occupational classification codes allow us to compare wages for
workers in the same type of jobs. In addition, our empirical strategy below exploits
geographic variation in exposure to daylight conditional on shift choice. In fact,
the average daily exposure to daylight differs across space for a given choice of
location around the clock. We rely on PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas) and
the associated latitude and longitudes of their geographic centroids to measure the
spatial location of each individual. Sometimes, several PUMAs are close enough
to each other that we construct bundles of PUMAs (essentially combinations of
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Workers Across Shifts in each Bundle
several PUMAs adjacent to each other) to base our analysis of social interactions
on a common notion of geographic distance.6
We keep a small number of observations for our final analysis sample. The
Appendix provides details on the construction of the sample. Table 3.1 presents
descriptive statistics for our main variables. Key to our social interaction analysis,
we also observe what the rest of the population is doing in the same geographic
location. We define spatial bundles of PUMAs in a given radius around each sam-
pled person. We describe the construction of bundles of PUMAs in the Appendix.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of location choices around the 24-hour clock for
the bundles in our analysis sample. In particular, the figure shows the distribution
of times at which individuals begin full time work.
6Since PUMAs are delimited by the number of sampled individuals, PUMAs for densely popu-
lated areas are relatively small. Therefore, we often times construct bundles of PUMAs to preserve
a homogenous notion of distance relevant for social interactions.
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As can be seen in the figure, while the population is heavily concentrated in
and around location 8, some non-negligible fraction begins work at some other non-
standard hours. In particular, the profile display some bumps at clock locations 15
and 23 mostly associated with the beginning of the second and third shift. Moreover,
note that the distribution of workers around the clock exhibits some heterogeneity
across bundles.
3.3.2 Sunset and Sunrise Times
In order to measure exposure to daylight associated with different shift choices in
each bundle we rely on bundle-specific sunrise and sunset times. We leverage an
astronomical formula that allow us to determine the sunrise and sunset time, and
resulting hours of daylight available for each day of the year in a given latitude and
longitude. We then apply this to the (lat,long) pair for each location (i.e. at the
centroid of each bundle of PUMAs). Using this information we then derive exposure
to daylight associated with each shift choice by assuming that workers sleep for eight
uninterrupted hours, wake up about two hours before beginning to work and remain
awake for sixteen hours before falling asleep again.7 We are then able to compute,
for each possible clock location in each spatial bundle, how many of those sixteen
hours involve exposure to daylight. Finally we average, these shift-specific daily
exposures to daylight across the year. Note that there is substantial latitudinal
variation in availability of daylight across the year. For example the amount of
daylight in South Florida is fairly constant across the year, whereas in places like
7We abstract from the choice of number of hours of sleep. There is a surprisingly small literature
in economics that looks at the important issue of optimal choice of hours of sleep. See Bergstrom
(1977), Hoffman (1977), Biddle and Hamermesh (1990), Hamermesh (2002) and Yaniv (2004)
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Seattle or Minneapolis is large during the Summer months and small during the
Winter. Moreover, conditional on a given latitude, there is substantial longitudinal
variation generated by time zones.8 For example, consider two individuals who wake
up at 6am according to their own time zones and who are living in two cities with
common latitude. Say, one of the cities is located at the west end of the eastern time
zone whereas the other is located at the east end of the central time zone. Even
when they are relatively close to each other and they wake up at the ”same” time,
their exposure to daylight will be different because the individual in the Central
time zone is effectively waking up one hour earlier and this induce a different level
of exposure.
Figure 3.2 documents the variation in exposure to daylight across different lo-
cation around the clock for our spatial bundles. Of course there is large variation
across shifts within bundles. For example, somebody who begins to work at 9am is
assumed to wake up at 7am and go to sleep at 11pm. This implies an exposure of
11 to 12 hours of daylight on average across the year. On the other hand, somebody
starting work at 11pm is in general exposed to approximately 6 hours of daylight.
Note that there is also some variation across bundles for a given shift.
3.3.3 Empirical Evidence on Shift Premia
Before turning to the model we examine whether in a first look at the data we ob-
serve any evidence of shift premia. We create and indicator of whether an individual
is a day worker (d = D) or a shift worker (d = S). We use information on the time
8See Hamermesh et al. (2008) for an explicit analysis of the role of time zones and television
schedules on patterns of work and sleep timing.
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Figure 3.2: Daily Exposure to Daylight Across Shifts and Bundles of PUMA’s
the individual departs from home to work and the time it takes him to get to work
to come up with an estimated time at which he starts working. Given the time at
which he starts working and the number of hours he works, we can compute the
number of hours the the individual works in each of the following two time ranges.
1. 8am to 4pm
2. 4pm to 8am.
We then define di = D (he/she is a day worker) if most of his work hours are in the
8am-4pm range and we define di = S (he/she is a shift worker) if most of his hours
fall in the 4pm-8am range.
The wage equation for individual i in bundle b when he chooses to work during
the day is given by
log(WiDb) = XiβD + λDb + εiDb (3.3.1)
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whereas if he chooses to be a shift worker it is given by
log(WiSb) = XiβS + λSb + εiSb (3.3.2)
Xi includes experience, education, gender, race, marital status, veteran status, an
indicator of whether the individual lives in a statistical metropolitan area (SMSA)
and indicators for different occupations. λDb and λSb denote indicators for the
different spatial bundles. Of course, we only get to see each individual working
either as a day worker or shift worker and therefore can only hope to observe his
wages in only one of these statuses. So we consider selection into shift work and
day work by estimating a selection model
dib =

D if Zipi + ηib > 0
S otherwise
(3.3.3)
where Zi = (Xi, Z1i) and Z1i serves as an exclusion restriction that explains selection
into shift but is excluded from teh wage equation. In the empirical implementation
Z1i denotes the percentage of shift workers within the industry in which individual i
works. We use this to selection correct the log wage equations and obtain estimates
(β̂D, β̂S). Table 3.2 presents the results
The coefficient associated with the inverse mills ratio is highly significant, im-
plying strong selection of workers into day and shift work. Using these estimates we
can compute predicted wages for day and shift work (ŴiD, ŴiS) for every individual
and obtain estimates of the individual-specific shift differential as 100 × ŴiS−ŴiD
ŴiD
.
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Then we can compute the average shift differential across the whole sample of work-
ers or for particular subsamples by simply averaging these individual specific shift
differentials.
Table 3.3 presents the results. Column 1 shows simple OLS estimates. Column
2 shows our preferred estimates that correct for selection into shift. As can be seen,
the shift premia is much smaller when we fail to control for selection into shift work.
The shift premium ranges between 3 to 5 percent. Once we account for selection
we find a shift premium of approximately 39%.
As can be seen, a large shift premia is necessary to elicit labor supply at non-
standard hours and in equilibrium the bulk of the labor force continues to offer its
services at conventional hours. But really, is human productivity that much higher
during the day? Most likely not. Why so few people work on night shifts? It
seems clear that people prefer day shift. But, is this mostly because they wish to
avoid the exposure to darkness associated with night shift or is it because almost
everybody else is working during the day? If the latter, we may in fact be stuck in a
bad (inefficient) equilibrium: everybody is behaving optimally, conditional on what
others are doing, but as a whole the equilibrium is not efficient. This a relatively
complex empirical question. In the next section we present the model that we will
estimate to attempt an answer.
3.4 A Model of Shift Choice
We adapt the urban framework in Bayer and Timmins (2005, 2007) to our context
by formulating a model of sorting around the clock. A location in our context is
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a specific hour around the clock in which the individual decides to begin to work
every day. Unlike the binary shift formulation used by Kostiuk (1990), the hourly
specification with 24 choices provides more precision when it comes to measure
exposure to light.
We take spatial location b as exogenous and model the choice of location around
the clock j. A location around the clock is indexed by the time an individual starts
work and it entails an uninterrupted period of 16 hours that starts when he wakes
up (two hours before starting to work) and ends when the individual goes to bed.
Consider individuals living in spatial bundles b = 1, ...., B.9.
Uijb = X
′
jbβi + αiσjb + γWijb + ξjb + εijb (3.4.1)
where Xjb is a vector of exogenous attributes of clock location j in bundle b. A key
attribute we are focusing on is daily exposure to daylight (in hours on average across
the year). σjb is the fraction of workers who choose clock location j in spatial bundle
b. This is the measure that will help us capture social interaction effects, if any. ξjb
is an attribute for clock location j in bundle b that is observed by individuals making
clock location decisions but unobserved by us, the econometricians. It collects and
summarizes what individuals observe about each clock location and affects their
utility. εijb represent i.i.d. (across individuals and clock locations) taste shifters
with extreme value distribution.
αi captures the strength and sign of the social interaction for each individual i.
9Explain how we define these bundles of MSAs. Centroid. Radius. etc...to get at the geographic
reference point for each individual.
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When αi < 0 there is a congestion effect. In this case, individuals tend to dislike very
popular clock locations. When αi > 0 there is an agglomeration effect. Individuals
tend to enjoy popular locations per se, over and above the features (if any) that
make them popular. We allow the social interaction effect to vary with exogenous
observable individual demographics Zi according to
αi = α0 + Z
′
iα1 (3.4.2)
βi is an individual specific taste parameter that can also vary with exogenous ob-
servables Zi. It captures the marginal utility of additional hours of exposure to
daylight.
βi = β0 + Z
′
iβ1 (3.4.3)
and Wijb is the Real Hourly Wage for individual i, if choosing clock location j in
spatial bundle b.
Replacing (5) and (6) into (4) we obtain
Uijb = X
′
jb(β0 + Z
′
iβ1) + (α0 + Z
′
iα1)σjb + γWijb + ξjb + εijb
Uijb = δjb + X
′
jbZiβ1 + σjbZiα1 + Wijγ + εijb
δjb = X
′
jbβ0 + α0σjb + ξjb
We consider the following assumptions: Uijb does not depend on Xkb or σkb for
k 6= j, σjb is the only endogenous variable, εi = (εi1, εi2, ....., εiJ) is observed by all
i = 1, ....., N and individuals play a static simultaneous move game and equilibrium
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behavior is governed by a simple Nash Equilibrium concept. A continuum of in-
dividuals exist for each observed realization of Zi. This allows us to integrate out
unobserved preferences and work directly with choice probabilities.
We can then write the clock location choice probabilities as
Pij = gij(Zi, X, σ; θ) ∀i, j
where
σj =
∑
i
Pij =
∑
i
gij(Zi, X, σ; θ)
σj = gj(Z,X, σ; θ) ∀j
σ = g(Z,X, σ; θ)
θ = {α, β, γ, ξ}
Definition 1 (Sorting Equilibrium). A sorting equilibrium is a set of individual
shift work decisions that are each optimal given the shift work decisions of all other
individuals in the population.
Note that a fixed point for σ = g(Z,X, σ; θ) satisfies the above definition and it
is easy to show that by Brower’s Fixed Point theorem, a fixed point to the mapping
defined by g exists. Equilibrium may or may not be unique, though. Whether or
not the equilibrium is unique depends on
1. the sign and magnitude of the social interaction, α
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2. the meaningful variation in household tastes σ2β;
3. the meaningful variation in fixed attributes across shift choices; and
4. the total number of choices (in this case J = 24)
The economic intuition for uniqueness goes as follows. Congestion effects pre-
serve the collective rank order of locations. Same applies to mild (0 < α < α) ag-
glomeration effects. On the other hand, strong agglomeration effects have the ability
to alter the equilibrium rank order of locations and thus allow for multiple equilib-
ria. Since no closed form for α is available, Bayer and Timmins (2005) show how a
simulation based approach can be used to computationally explore how changes in
the characteristics of the shift choice problem would affect the likelihood of multi-
ple equilibria (how they affect the threshold α). They conclude that the larger the
number of choices J , the meaningful variation in exogenous shift characteristics,
β0σ
2
X or the heterogeneity in household preferences, σ
2
β , the larger the maximum
agglomeration effect that can sustain uniqueness. The basic economic intuition for
these results is that increases in any of the three dimensions reduce the ability of
a given agglomeration effect to alter the rank-order of collective preferences. Im-
portantly, the estimator proposed by Bayer and Timmins (2007) is robust to the
presence of multiple equilibria
3.5 Estimation
We follow Bayer and Timmins (2007) in using a two step strategy. In the first step,
we proceed by maximum likelihood on the clock location choice microdata. In the
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second step, 2SLS is used to decompose the shift specific effects, {δjb}Jj=1 for each
bundle b.
The empirical strategy exploits spatial variation in sunset and sunrise timing
data combined with Population Census microdata on earnings and shift choice
data.10
Recall clock location preferences are given by
Uijb = δjb + X
′
jbZiβ1 + σjbZiα1 + Wijγ + εijb (3.5.1)
δjb = X
′
jbβ0 + α0σjb + ξjb (3.5.2)
Using sunset and sunrise timing data we compute {{Xjb}Jj=1}Bb=1 the average
exposure to daylight associated with choosing clock location j, when living in spatial
bundle b. We exploit the Census data on earnings to compute the hourly wage that
each individual would earn in the event of choosing shift j, when living in bundle b.
Of course, we only observe Wij for individual i and his chosen clock location j but
not at other clock locations. We need to predict what those counterfactual wages
would be. For this we estimate the following wage equations for each clock location
j = 1, 2....J correcting for selection into it.
log(Wijb) = θ0 + θ1Z
W
i + θjDij + λb + ηij (3.5.3)
where Dij is an indicator that equals one when the individual chooses clock loca-
10Not only do we use the shift choice microdata in its own right but we also aggregate the
microdata on shift choice to come up with shares of population choosing to ”wake up” at different
times in each spatial location.
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tion j and it is zero otherwise. ZWi are individual determinants of wages such as
education, experience, gender, race, veteran status. We also control for occupation
effects given that some low wage occupations are disproportionately concentrated in
night shifts. In addition we allow for bundle dummies, λb. As exclusion restriction,
in the selection equation we include an indicator of whether the individual is single
and has at least one child. Using these estimates, for each individual i in bundle b
we predict Ŵijb for all j
After estimating these unobserved we proceed with the two-step strategy. First,
we maximize the likelihood of the shift choice microdata. In doing so we estimate
the first stage parameters
θ1 =
({
{δjb}Jj=1
}B
b=1
, α1, β1, γ
)
(3.5.4)
where {δjb}Jj=1 is treated as a set of fixed shift effects for spatial bundle b. These
fixed effects are estimated jointly with the other model parameters. While the
model may display multiple equilibria, we can condition on the realized equilibrium
and consistently recover the parameters from the microdata.
Indeed, if we let Ω = {X,Z,W, [δ, α1, β1, γ]} then the likelihood function is
actually given by
L =
∑
σ
P (σ|Ω)
{∏
i
∏
j
Pi(j|σ,Ω)Ii,j
}
(3.5.5)
and the probability that a given equilibrium arises, P (σ|Ω) , does not depend on
the particular location decisions of individual agents. We then avoid the complex
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part of the likelihood P (σ|Ω) and estimate parameters based on
{
δ̂, α̂1, β̂1, γ̂
}
= arg max
δ,α1,β1,γ
{∏
i
∏
j
Pr (dij = 1|σ,Ω, Zi)dij
}
(3.5.6)
Pr (dij = 1|σ,Ω, Zi) =
exp
(
δjb + X
′
jbZiβ1 + σjbZiα1 + Ŵijbγ
)
∑
exp
(
δkb + X ′kbZiβ1 + σkbZiα1 + Ŵikbγ
) (3.5.7)
A bundle specific contraction mapping similar to that developed by Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995) and adapted to urban choice models in Bayer, McMillan & Rueben
(2011) is used to get {δjb} for each trial of (α1, β1, γ) . Formally, the estimation
problems becomes
{
δ̂, α̂1, β̂1, γ̂
}
= arg max
α1,β1,γ
{∏
i
∏
j
Pr (dij = 1|σ,Ω, Zi)di,j
}
(3.5.8)
s.t. {δjb}Jj=1 = the fixed point of the following contraction mapping
for bundleb
δ
(n+1)
jb = T
(
δ
(n)
b
)
for all j, in bundle b
T
(
δ
(n)
b
)
= δ
(n)
jb − ln
 P̂r
(
dj = 1|α1, β1, γ,
{
δ
(n)
kb
}J
k=1
)
σobsjb

After recovering the first stage parameters 2SLS is used to decompose the shift
specific effects, δ̂jb by pooling data from all spatial bundles and using δ̂jb as depen-
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dent variables in the following linear regression model
δ̂jb = X
′
jbβ0 + α0σjb + λb + ξjb (3.5.9)
OLS estimation of α0 would be inconsistent because of the endogeneity σjb.
Indeed, the model implies that σjb and ξjb will most likely be correlated: each
individual observes ξjb and influences his clock location choice. Other individuals
do the same. In the aggregate the share of individuals in spatial bundle b choosing
clock location j will depend on ξjb. We then estimate α0 using IV to account for
endogeneity of σjb.
Our proposed instrument exploits the fixed exogenous attributes of other clock
location choices k 6= j. Indeed, this is plausibly valid instrument because clock
location choice depends not only on own clock location attributes but also on how
those attributes compare against the attributes of other clock locations. However,
attributes of other clock locations X ′kb for k 6= j do not influence δjb. We follow
Bayer and Timmins (2007) and use the hypothetical share for each clock location
that would arise absent any spillover if only observed attributes mattered.
To compute our instrument we consider the predicted clock location share
σ̂jb that can be obtained from the model with estimated first stage parameters{{
δ̂jb
}J
j=1
}B
b=1
, γ̂, β̂1 and initial guess β˜0 for β0 but setting both the unobserved
attribute and the social interaction effect to zero.
ξ = 0, α = 0
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The share given by the model is
σjb = Pr (dj = 1|X,α = 0, ξ = 0, β0, β1, γ)
=
∫
Pr (dj = 1|X,α = 0, ξ = 0, β0, β1, γ, Zi) f (Zi) dZi
and can be estimated by
σ̂jb = P̂r
(
dj = 1|X,α = 0, ξ = 0, β˜0, β̂1, γ̂
)
=
1
Nb
Nb∑
i=1
P̂r
(
dj = 1|X,α = 0, ξ = 0, β˜0, β̂1, γ̂, Zi
)
=
1
Nb
Nb∑
i=1
 exp
(
X ′jb
(
β˜0 + Z
′
iβ̂1
)
+ γ̂Wij
)
∑J
k=1 exp
(
X ′kb
(
β˜0 + Z ′iβ̂1
)
+ γ̂Wik
)

We then obtain β̂0, α̂0 by estimating by 2SLS given the guess β˜0 and using σ̂jb as
instrument for σjb. We repeat this procedure until the guess β˜0 equals β̂0. Standard
errors are computed using bootstrap.11
3.6 Willingness to Pay for an Extra Hour of Daylight
In this section we use the model to derive measures of willingness to pay. These
measures, in turn help us decompose the observed wage premium for shift work into
a portion attributable to social interactions and a portion due to reduced exposure
11In the empirical implementation we actually focus on a subsample of individuals who work
on occupations that have enough incidence across all the 24 locations around the clock so that
the model can be identified. Therefore we split σjb into a part that is endogenous and reflect
aggregate clock location choices of individuals in spatial bundle b and a completementary part
that is exogenous and composed of workers who do not choose clock location. Therefore only the
endogenous portion of σjb is instrumented in our estimation algorithm.
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to daylight. Table 3.4 presents the estimated parameters for a model specification
in which we allow αi and βi to vary by gender by considering Zi = 1 if i is a female,
0 otherwise.
With the estimates of the model at hand we can explore what’s the willingness to
pay for daylight in the population of workers. We can derive measures of willingness
to pay for daylight based on β̂i and γ̂. Table 3.5 shows the results.
The results show that males have higher willingness to pay for daylight. As we
can see the OLS estimates that ignore the endogeneity of the fraction of people in
each clock location underestimate the willingness to pay for daylight by up to 20
percent. The preferred IV estimates show that males are willing to give up to 45
cents of their hourly wage for each additional hour of daily exposure to daylight.
This means they are willing to pay up to $3.59 per day (i.e. approximately $18
per week or $900 per year) for each additional hour of daylight. This implies, for
example, that the daylight component of the shift premium required to induce
somebody working in the 9am shift to work at the 11pm shift (for a reduction of
12− 6 = 6 hours of daylight exposure) would be approximately 18%12
We can also compute similar estimates of willingness to pay for ”companion-
ship”. That we can estimate how much individuals are willing to pay to have an
additional 1% of the population within a 10 mile radius to choosing their same clock
location. Table 3.6 presents the results.
The estimates of WTP for companionship are large in magnitude. Here OLS
overestimates the magnitude. Our preferred IV estimates indicate that males are
12Taking the average hourly wage in the sample $15.08 we get ( 0.45×614.6 = 0.18)
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willing to pay $780 per year of 1 percentage point increase in the share of closeby
population choosing the same clock location. This implies, for example, that the
social interaction component of the shift premium required to induce somebody
working in the 9am shift to work at the 11pm shift (for a reduction of 15.5 percentage
points in the share of nearby population choosing the same clock location ) would
be approximately 41%13
The WTP estimates imply that clock location 23 (11pm) should command a
premium of 18+41=59%. Indeed if we re-estimate the simple day work/shift work
model as in Kostiuk (1990) but only using workers who start to work at 9am (as day
workers) or 11pm (as shift workers) we find that the selection corrected premium is
53%, fairly close to the number derived from our clock location model (59%). The
advantage of our approach is that we can tease out how much of this premium is
due to something that we can do nothing about (i.e. reduced exposure to daylight)
and how much of it is really due to something (i.e. low companionship) that is more
malleable and can actually change for the better in alternative equilibria.
3.7 Conclusions
Willingness to pay for daylight is shown to be a significant, but by no means ex-
haustive component of shift premia required to elicit labor supply at non-standard
hours. Our estimates account for social interactions externalities in the timing of
work and for the endogenous sorting across locations around the clock. They imply
that the wage premia required to elicit labor supply at non-standard hours is not
13Taking the average hourly wage in the sample $15.08 we get ( 0.39×15.514.6 = 0.41)
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an immutable, hard wired feature of preferences for daylight. Indeed, our estimates
imply that only (18
59
× 100 =) 30 percent of the premium is due to compensating
differential for darkness disamenity. Moreover, from each individual’s own perspec-
tive, the required premium becomes smaller, the larger the fraction of the population
that will be accompanying him/her at those hours. Our results have intriguing im-
plications for potential welfare gains associated with an alternative equilibrium in
which the workforce is more evenly distributed around the clock: while we have
large productivity gains spurred by more efficient use of capital and infrastructure,
welfare loses associated with less exposure to daylight during the night hours are
much smaller when a significant fraction of the population is working at those hours.
The implication is that one can compensate a large part of the welfare loss induced
by reduced exposure to daylight by having a substantial share of the population
providing companionship at non-standard hours.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
0 to 5 years of education 0.01 0.11
6 to 9 years of education 0.04 0.19
10 to 13 years of education 0.69 0.46
14 to 16 years of education 0.23 0.42
more than 16 years of education 0.03 0.18
Years of Experience 21.21 9.38
Male 0.81 0.39
Non-White 0.2 0.4
Veteran 0.19 0.39
Single and with at least 1 child under 13 0.06 0.24
Source: 2000 Census of Population. Final Analysis Sample Size N= 13576 corresponding to 16 bundles of PUMAs.
See Appendix for details on sample construction.
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Table 3.2: OLS and Selection Correction Estimates of Log Wage Equations for Day
and Shift Workers
OLS Selection Correction
Variable shift day shift day
Experience 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.027*** 0.049***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Experience2 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Experience3 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.002***
(0.001) (0) (0.001) (0)
Male 0.207*** 0.266*** 0.201*** 0.254***
(0.023) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015)
Nonwhite -0.069*** -0.047*** -0.073*** -0.066***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.02) (0.014)
Married 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.080*** 0.100***
(0.017) (0.01) (0.017) (0.011)
Veteran -0.011 0.011 -0.016 -0.001
(0.02) (0.012) (0.02) (0.013)
SMSA 0.046** 0.067*** 0.049*** 0.079***
(0.019) (0.01) (0.018) (0.011)
6 to 9 yrs of education 0.161* 0.139*** 0.160* 0.139***
(0.091) (0.051) (0.082) (0.049)
10 to 13 yrs of education 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.325***
(0.081) (0.047) (0.075) (0.045)
14 to 16 yrs of education 0.440*** 0.408*** 0.444*** 0.426***
(0.082) (0.048) (0.077) (0.046)
gt 16 yrs of education 0.409*** 0.500*** 0.413*** 0.528***
(0.09) (0.057) (0.086) (0.053)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.103** 0.382***
(0.041) (0.039)
Constant 1.931*** 1.964*** 2.019*** 1.740***
(0.108) (0.068) (0.113) (0.071)
Observations 3444 10132 3444 10132
Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include (not show in table)
spatial bundle effects and occupation effects. Analysis sample based on 2000 Population Census.
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Table 3.3: Shift Differentials (% premium over standard day work)
All 4.6 39
White 5 39.4
Non-White 2.7 38
Shift premia computed based on estimated wage equations using our final analysis sample from the 2000 Population
Census.
Table 3.4: Parameters of the Clock Location Model
Variable Estimate Standard Error
α0 9.44 (1.46)
α1 0.93 (0.73)
β0 0.11 (0.03)
β1 -0.04 (0.09)
γ 0.24 (0.41)
Table 3.5: Estimates of Willingess to Pay (WTP) for Daylight
Hourly Daily Weekly Annual
2nd Stage: OLS
Female $ 0.21 $1.71 $8.57 $428.58
Male $ 0.39 $3.13 $15.65 $782.46
2nd Stage: IV
Female $ 0.27 $2.18 $10.89 $544.25
Male $ 0.45 $3.59 $17.97 $898.26
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Table 3.6: Estimates of Willingess to Pay (WTP) for Companionship
Hourly Daily Weekly Annual
2nd Stage: OLS
Female $ 0.47 $3.73 $18.66 $932.79
Male $ 0.43 $3.42 $17.12 $855.96
2nd Stage: IV
Female $ 0.43 $3.43 $17.15 $857.25
Male $ 0.39 $3.12 $15.61 $780.44
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Appendices
3.A Spatial Bundles
Construction of Spatial Bundles:
We started with the variable defined as Consistent PUMA (CONSPUMA) in the
census data. CONSPUMA identifies the most detailed geographic areas that can
consistently be identified across samples from 1980 onward. This variable is fully
comparable across years. Each CONSPUMA consists of many PUMAs and the
data provides the latitude and longitude of each PUMA. We calculate the centroid
of each CONSPUMA by averaging the latitude and longitude of each PUMA in
that CONSPUMA. We then calculate the distance between all the CONSPUMA’s
using the Great Circle Distance formula which is the shortest distance between any
two points on the surface of a sphere measured along a path on the surface of the
sphere.14 Taking the centroid of each CONSPUMA as the center of a bundle, all
CONSPUMAs that were within 10 miles of the centroid were counted as a part of
that bundle. The reason for this is that in CONSPUMAs that are close enough to
14The formula used is:
distance = 6371.01 ∗ arctan

√
(cosφ2sin∆λ)
2 + (cosφ1sinφ2 − sinφ1cosφ2cos∆λ)2
sinφ1sinφ2 + cosφ1cosφ2cos∆λ

where,
• φ1, λ1;φ2, λ2 are the geographical latitude and longitude of the two CONSPUMA’s
• ∆λ is the difference in longitude between the two CONSPUMA’s
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each other the percentage of people working in a given shift might be determined
by people belonging to all the CONSPUMAs. Hence the percentage in own shift
for the people in the CONSPUMA was calculated by including all the people in the
bundle
3.B Analysis Sample
The final analysis sample used in estimation is constructed in the following way:
since we use annual earnings to construct our measure of hourly wage, we keep
individuals who worked between 48 and 52 weeks last year. Moreover, we only
keep those individuals who report usually working 40 hours per week. We restrict
our sample to individuals 18 to 55 year old. We also discard those observations
for whom the time they depart from home to work is missing as this prevents us
from constructing a measure of location around the clock. Finally to minimize the
incidence of outliers we drop observations whose hourly wage is less that one dollar.
Finally, we drop all occupations in spatial bundles that have at least one clock
location without a single worker. This leads to several small spatial bundles being
dropped as no occupation satisfies this requirement.
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